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 5 
Introduction 
 
How do we predict the development of atmospheric CO2 concentration over the next 
decades given CO2 emissions and absorptions? How do we predict the development of our 
bank accounts, or the development of a start-up company? Understanding dynamic systems 
and predicting their often non-linear developments is of critical importance in many areas of 
life and has, during the last years, gained increasing interest though the emerging research 
domain of the psychological dimensions of climate change (Swim et al., 2011). The climate is 
a dynamic system that poses challenges to understanding (Amelung & Funke, 2013; Moxnes 
& Saysel, 2009). Correct understanding of the climate system may be a key factor, however, 
for accurate reasoning and decision-making about climate change (Newell, McDonald, 
Brewer & Hayes, 2014; Reynolds, Bostrom, Read & Morgan, 2010), and the accuracy of 
people’s mental models of the environment is a good predictor of their degree of concern, 
voting intentions, and willingness to take action (Bord, O’Connor & Fisher, 2000; Bostrom et 
al., 2012; Guy, Kashima, Walker & O'Neill, 2013). The present research therefore tries to shed 
light on how and how accurately people understand dynamic systems and predict non-linear 
developments. Albeit previous research delivered a rather pessimistic picture of people’s 
understanding of the behavior of dynamic systems (for a review, see Sterman, 2011) and their 
predictions of non-linearity (Wagenaar & Sagaria, 1975; DeLosh, Busemeyer & McDaniel, 
1997; McDaniel, Dimperio, Griego & Busemeyer, 2009), I will argue and present evidence 
that some of the previously found difficulties can be explained by critical aspects of the 
research methods used in these studies, and some can be alleviated. 
A common type of dynamic system that is of critical importance to climate change is 
stock-flow (SF) systems. SF systems contain an inflow of an entity flowing from the 
environment into the system, an outflow of an entity flowing out of the system into the 
environment, and a stock, the current level of an entity within the system. That is, a stock is 
an entity that accumulates or depletes over time (Jay Forrester referred to them as levels), 
flows are the rate of change in a stock (rates; Forrester, 1968). As such, stocks and flows are 
not only basic building blocks of many dynamic systems such as of births and deaths shaping 
a nation's population growth (or decline), a federal government running a budget deficit by 
spending more than it taxes, or the number of available beds in a hospital changing over time 
with the rate of people delivered to hospital and their recovery rate; with atmospheric 
greenhouse gas (GHG) concentration and the greenhouse effect, also probable causes of 
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climate change (Crowley, 2000) adhere to an SF structure: GHG accumulate in the 
atmosphere as a function of GHG emissions and natural absorptions, and the energy within 
the climate system accumulates as a function of incoming solar radiation and reflected solar 
radiation. (So that the higher atmospheric GHG concentration, the more solar energy is 
retained within the climate system, and the more global temperature is affected.) That is, on a 
fundamental level, the greenhouse effect and the mechanism of how it affects global 
temperature follows an SF structure.  
Non-linear developments in turn are an inherent property to many natural systems 
such as the atmosphere (Palmer, 1993). For example, it was found that surface temperature 
may respond nonlinearly to changes in ozone (Thompson & Solomon, 2002), ecosystems may 
react nonlinearly to even small changes in climate conditions (Burkett et al., 2005), and crop 
yields may be nonlinearly affected by changes in temperature (Schlenker & Roberts, 2008).  
Being able to predict non-linear developments is therefore vital for anticipating these changes, 
a prerequisite for adaptation planning (Burkett et al., 2005). Taken together, SF systems and 
nonlinear dynamics are key elements of a basic understanding of climate change, its 
prerequisites, and its consequences.  
Two major difficulties understanding SF systems and predicting nonlinearity were 
made out, however. First, people have severe difficulties inferring structural relations, both of 
SF systems and of cue-criterion relations describing the over-time change of non-linear 
processes. It was repeatedly found that when presented with an SF system, the majority of 
people fail at inducing its correct system structure (e.g., Cronin, Gonzalez & Sterman 2009; 
Cronin & Gonzalez, 2007). This SF failure was found, for example, when participants were 
told that CO2 emissions are currently twice as high as absorptions, and then tended to believe 
that if CO2 emissions decrease by 30%, atmospheric CO2 concentration will decrease as well. 
When assessing understanding of non-linear processes in the function-learning paradigm, 
participants are given numerical cue and criterion values in a continuous environment and 
asked to predict future criterion values. Similarly to a lack of rule-induction in SF tasks, the 
majority of extrapolations was found to be in line with the assumption that participants do not 
abstract a rule describing the structural cue-criterion relations (DeLosh, Busemeyer & 
McDaniel, 1997). Rather, most people seem to adopt simple exemplar-based prediction 
strategies that use only a shred of all the available training information (Kwantes, Neal & 
Kalish, 2012; McDaniel, Dimperio, Griego & Busemeyer, 2009).  
 Second, many real-life situations involve linearity, and proportional thinking and the 
linear model can be used to describe a range of phenomena and various dynamic systems 
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(Dawes & Corrigan, 1974; Funke, 1993). There is ample evidence on the “illusion of 
linearity” (Van Dooren et al., 2003), however, showing that students and adults tend to 
over-apply linear and proportional thinking to non-linear cases (DeBock, Van Dooren, 
Janssens & Verschaffel, 2002; Van Dooren, De Bock, Janssens, & Verschaffel, 2008). 
Most important for the present research, this over-application of linearity also seems to be 
the case when predicting the future development of SF systems (Guy, Kashima,Walker, & 
O’Neill, 2013; Moxnes & Saysel, 2009; Sterman, 2008), and when learning to predict 
non-linear processes (DeLosh, Busemeyer & McDaniel, 1997; Kwantes, Neal & Kalish, 
2012; McDaniel, Dimperio, Griego & Busemeyer, 2009).  
 Specifically, in the case of SF systems, people tend to apply correlational thinking, 
apparently believing that the output of a dynamic system should be linearly correlated to 
its input such as believing that when the inflow is increasing, the stock should necessarily 
be increasing as well (Sweeney & Sterman, 2000; Cronin & Gonzalez, 2007; Cronin, 
Gonzalez & Sterman, 2009; Gonzalez & Wong, 2012). Concerning the case of function-
learning, prediction models that assume linear extrapolation based on the most similar 
training exemplars were found to describe human extrapolation well for different—also 
non-linear—cue-criterion relations (DeLosh, Busemeyer & McDaniel, 1997; Kalish, 
Lewandowsky & Kruschke, 2004). Interestingly, and demonstrating an over-application of 
linear thinking in the climate context, it was reasoned that—despite nonlinear 
relationships being the rule rather than the exception in biological systems—natural 
resource managers seem to be under the impression of linear ecological responses to 
climate change (Burkett et al., 2005). Thus, possibly directly related to the first difficulty, 
lack of induction of the system structure, people seem to apply simplifying, linear 
prediction heuristics when asked to predict future states of non-linear dynamics. 
 It is a main goal of the present research to try to contribute to our understanding of 
people’s previously found difficulties with SF systems and non-linearity by investigating 
the factors that may determine whether people guide their predictions by an induced rule 
or by linearity heuristics. There will be three major lines of reasoning. 
        First, in order to convincingly establish people's apparent difficulties to infer the SF 
system structure, the SF failure, it is necessary to find means that allow for a valid 
assessment of people’s mental models of the SF structure. I will argue, however, that the 
original task format used in previous research (e.g., Sterman, 2008, 2011), might not be 
seen a valid test because it contained error-prone aspects that might have lead to a 
systematic overestimation of correlation-heuristic use, and a systematic underestimation 
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of people’s true understanding of SF systems. That is, in Manuscript 1, I will argue that 
the previously found SF failure can partially be explained by a format effect. 
        Second, when participants need to answer questions about higher-level system 
elements from lower-level system elements such as the development of a stock from given 
flows, participants need to relate the given lower-level elements instead of observing them 
in isolation. This is because on higher, macro levels, systems may possess properties that 
do not inhere in the elements, that are irreducible to isolated system elements (Wilensky & 
Resnick, 1999). This holds in even the most basic systems such as the properties of the 
stock of fish in a fishpond arising through the interplay of extraction and reproduction, so 
that it may posses the property of being, say, decreasing even though extraction and 
reproduction rate both are increasing. For understanding dynamic systems—correctly 
inferring their system structure—more concrete processing of isolated system elements 
should thus be detrimental, whereas more abstract processing of patterns of relations 
between elements should be beneficial. Manuscript 2 will propose a basic structural and 
cognitive correspondence between processing of elements versus structures in dynamic 
systems and hierarchical figures (global element made up of local elements): Analogously 
to how the behavior of a system arises through the functional relations between its 
elements, the global element in hierarchical figures arises through spatial relations 
between its elements. If this basic correspondence holds, people who tend to focus on the 
constituent elements of hierarchical figures might tend to fail at inducing the overall 
behavior of a dynamic system, while people who tend to focus on the global configuration 
might tend to succeed at inducing the overall system behavior.  
 Third, individual ability to memorize and update information about the to-be predicted 
process (working memory capacity) together with the structure of the process may 
determine which prediction strategy participants use, and it may determine success or 
failure of that strategy. In Manuscript 3, I will argue that people are more likely to use 
cognitively taxing rule-based strategies when they provide a prediction advantage: In 
accelerating compared to asymptotic processes. Moreover, it was implicitly assumed 
previously that rule-based predictions lead to higher prediction accuracy compared to 
linear exemplar-based strategies (McDaniel et al., 2014). However, such a prediction 
advantage may depend on the structure of the process as well: In asymptotic compared to 
accelerating environments, integrating a range of training information to infer the system 
structure may actually lead to overfitting and lower generalizability compared to simple 
linear exemplar-based strategies.  
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Improving stock-flow reasoning with verbal formats: Manuscript 1  
 
 It was repeatedly found that the majority of people fail at understanding dynamic 
stock-flow systems (Cronin & Gonzalez, 2007; Gonzalez & Wong, 2012; see Sterman, 2011 
for a review). Importantly, this SF failure (Cronin, Gonzalez & Sterman, 2009) was shown to 
occur even in the basic case of two input variables (inflow and outflow), and one output 
(stock), and in simple pen-paper based tasks where system control in a simulation was not 
required (Cronin & Gonzalez, 2007; Gonzalez & Wong, 2012; Sterman, 2002). Given the 
relevance and ubiquity of SF systems ranging from national debts to climate change, people’s 
difficulties in understanding those systems seems to pose a severe threat. However, given the 
intuitive claim that complexity increases as the elements relevant to solution increase (e.g., 
Dörner, 1983; but see Funke, 1984, 2010), and given dynamic system’s simple underlying SF 
structure, people’s poor understanding of even the most basic SF systems also seems 
surprising.  
In previous tasks assessing understanding of SF dynamics (Sterman & Sweeney, 2002, 
2007), referred to as the original format hereafter, participants were typically presented with a 
graph depicting a stock such as atmospheric CO2 concentration stabilizing from the year 2100 
onwards, and with a graph depicting previous in-and outflows such as CO2 emissions and 
absorptions trajectories (Figure 1). Participants were asked to sketch emission and absorption 
trajectories such that a stabilizing CO2 concentration could be achieved. A repeated finding 
was correlation heuristic use (referred to as pattern matching in graphical tasks), sketching in- 
and outflows that simply parallel (match) the trajectory of the stock, i.e., continuous increase 
followed by stabilization. SF failure was also demonstrated for multiple choice answer 
formats, different outcome scenarios (e.g., atmospheric CO2 concentration stabilizing or 
dropping to zero), different semantic embeddings including more familiar contexts than CO2 
concentration (Sweeney & Sterman, 2000; Cronin & Gonzalez, 2007; Sterman & Sweeney, 
2002, 2007) and both graphical and textual display (Cronin, Gonzalez & Sterman, 2009). 
Given this multitude of research that convergently found SF failure, it was reasoned that there 
is an intrinsic difficulty to understand the structure of dynamic systems: “stock-flow failure is 
a robust phenomenon that appears to be a function of the mental models constructed and used 
when encountering a dynamic system” (Cronin et al., 2009, p. 116). 
I will present evidence, however, that might call into question both aspects of SF 
failure, that it is (a) a robust phenomenon (addressed mainly in a previous study to 
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Manuscript 1: Fischer & Degen, 2012), and that (b) it is a function of erroneous mental 
models of dynamic systems (addressed mainly in Manuscript 1). Specifically, I will argue that 
the appearance of SF failure is largely contingent on specifics of the task format used 
previously: A substantial part of people’s difficulties with SF systems can be explained by 
how in the original format, lower-level, isolated system elements were highly salient, biasing 
participants to work with these cues rather than to make use of the system structure; and how 
the original format contained error-prone aspects that caused difficulties in itself, leading to a 
systematic underestimation of people’s true reasoning abilities in dynamic systems.  
The first reason to doubt the validity of the original paradigm is that it arguably did not 
induce the impression that the system structure needs to be abstracted in the first place. 
Rather, the original task format might have induced the impression that one needs to process 
the task on a very concrete level. Concrete numbers were highly salient, and as Figure 1 
shows, this was also true—or rather: especially true—for the “textual” version of the task 
(Cronin et al., 2009).  However, no specific numbers are needed to infer the system structure, 
as the authors argue themselves: “In all cases, it is possible to answer correctly without 
knowledge of calculus and without carrying out any calculations” (Cronin et al., 2009, p. 
126). The previously found "robustness" of the SF failure might therefore be caused by a 
systematic induction of erroneous reasoning strategies in all versions of the original tasks. 
In a first study (N=170), we (Fischer & Degen, 2012) tested the asserted robustness of 
the SF failure, and whether the original format induces the impression that the task needs to 
be solved by calculating instead of by trying to induce the system structure. To test the 
robustness of the SF failure, we investigated whether solution rates vary as a function of 
minute surface changes in both the graphical (e.g., Sweeny & Sterman, 2000; Sterman & 
Sweeney, 2007) and the textual version of the original task (Cronin et al., 2009) while keeping 
constant the system structure. To test whether participants try to solve the task by calculating, 
we varied whether the initial stock was given or not while, again, keeping constant the system 
structure. If participants try to calculate with the given numbers, the initial stock is a relevant 
starting point for adding and subtracting the respective flows, influencing solution rates; if 
participants try to infer the system structure, however, the initial stock is an irrelevant 
information that should not affect solution rates. Furthermore, we hypothesized that the use of 
the correlation heuristic might have been induced by the way flows and stocks were displayed 
in the original task format because the inflow followed the same trajectory as the stock (see 
Fig.1). This parallel, and obviously correct, development in the past might easily induce the 
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impression that the future development of flows and stocks should be parallel as well—that is, 
matching patterns. !
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Figure 1. The original task (Sterman & Sweeny, 2002, 2007; Sterman, 2008; Cronin et 
al., 2009) in the graphical (CO2 task; left) and the textual version (department store task; 
right). 
 
We developed three variations of the graphical display that were administered within 
participants in different scenarios (e.g., members of a club, customers within a department 
store), and that will be described with the department store scenario. Equivalently to the 
original format, participants were first shown a graph depicting the trajectory of the stock, and 
were then given the following task: “The following Figure depicts the number of people 
entering and leaving the department store. Please draw how many people must enter and leave 
the store in order to achieve the above stock”. First, we varied whether the initial stock (IS) 
was given or not (IS vs. ~IS condition). In the ~IS condition, participants only received the 
introductory sentences above, in the IS condition, participants received the additional 
information: “At the beginning, 32 customers are inside the store”. Second, we varied the 
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presentation of in- and outflow. While in the original paradigm, the inflow was depicted as a 
line and the outflow was depicted as a dot (Figure 1), we created an additional condition (2L 
vs. ~2L condition) in which both the in– and outflow were presented as lines because a dot 
might induce the impression of a static quantity rather than that of a flow-variable, and 
because verbal protocols of a pilot study showed that many participants were indeed puzzled 
by the different visualization of in-and outflow. Third, we varied whether a pattern matching 
solution was suggested in the task display or not (PM vs. ~PM condition). In the PM 
condition, the inflow followed the same trajectory as the to-be completed stock, in the ~PM 
condition, the inflow followed a different trajectory as the to-be completed stock such as 
decreasing when the stock was increasing. In the textual display, we varied whether the initial 
stock was given, or not (with the same additional information as used in the graphical display) 
such that the ~IS condition was equivalent to the textual version of the original task.  
As Figure 2 shows, solution rates varied drastically as a function of variations in the 
display (Please note that the ~IS, ~2L condition is equivalent to the original task format and 
may serve as a baseline; Sterman & Sweeney, 2002, 2007). Largely in line with previous 
results, the solution rate was 16% in the original task; it increased up to 40%, however, when 
the initial stock was given and both flows were displayed as lines. In the textual display, 
solution rates doubled from 40% in the original task to 80% when the initial stock was given, 
suggesting that in the “textual” version, participants are especially prone to solving the task 
by calculating. In contrast to our expectation, however, the suggestion of pattern matching in 
the task display did not affect solution rates or use of the pattern matching heuristic.   
Given the sheer range of solution rates caused by minimal changes in the display (such 
as lines versus dots), SF failure is not a robust phenomenon that appears irrespective of the 
task format; rather, the occurrence of SF failure seems to be highly variable, and contingent 
upon how the system is displayed. If SF failure is caused by a fundamental limitation of 
people’s mental models (Cronin et al., 2009), however, it should be robust to such minor 
manipulations in the task display. Moreover, the original task display seems to bias people to 
answer questions about the stock by calculating rather than trying to induce the structural SF 
principle, suggesting that from low solution rates in the original format, one cannot 
necessarily conclude that people possess wrong mental models about the dynamic system, let 
alone an intrinsic inability to understand the SF structure. Rather, low solution rates seem to 
reflect people’s difficulties to solve the task by calculating. The pattern matching heuristic, 
however, seems to be a robust strategy that is not simply induced by the way stocks and flows 
are displayed.  
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              Figure 2. Solution rates for different conditions of both the graphical (left) and 
textual version (right) of the original SF task format. IS vs. ~IS denotes whether the initial 
stock is given or not, 2L vs. ~2L denotes whether the in- and outflow is depicted as two lines 
or not. Please note that the  ~IS,~2L condition is equivalent to the original task format (e.g., 
Sterman & Sweeny, 2002, 2007). 
 
The second reason to doubt the validity of the original task format is that it arguably 
contained error-prone aspects that are difficult to understand for participants. When assessing 
people’s mental models, it is important to ensure that the construct-relevant variance caused 
by the different mental models be measured, rather than construct-irrelevant variance caused 
by the assessment technique itself. However, in spite of variation, different version of the 
original task had one thing in common: a rather scientific notation including coordinate 
systems and graphs, percentage values in multiple-choice answer options (e.g., “Gradually 
rise less than 8%“), and technical terms in both the introduction (“Currently, the net removal 
of atmospheric CO2 by natural processes is about half of the anthropogenic CO2 emissions”) 
and the figure captions (e.g., “GtC/year”). We (Fischer, Degen & Funke, 2015) hypothesized 
that the original paradigm might have concealed participants’ true understanding of SF 
dynamics, that is, their true mental models of the system and investigated whether the original 
format assessed not only understanding of the causal system structure, but also of the task 
format itself. In our first study (Fischer & Degen, 2012), we found that use of the pattern 
matching heuristic is not simply induced by the task display. Since people generally seem to 
prefer making use of the causal structure of their environment whenever possible (rule-bias; 
Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Leola, & Waldron, 1998; Juslin, Olsson & Olsson, 2003), we tested 
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whether correlation heuristic use is reduced if detection of the causal SF structure is made 
easier. Moreover, leaning on our previous results how the original format seems to bias 
participants to approach the task by calculating, we tried to find a task format that highlights 
relations between elements, and tested whether such a format makes it more likely for 
participants to induce the system structure. In a word, it was the aim of Manuscript 1 to show 
how the previously robust SF failure can at least partially be explained—and how it can be 
alleviated. 
 
In Manuscript 1, we investigated whether the previously well-established SF failure 
can partially be explained by a format effect. Participants (N=107) completed SF tasks 
structurally similar to those used in previous research. Participants were given a graph 
depicting in-and outflow of a system, and then completed questions about the system, 
measuring system understanding (e.g., “If CO2 emissions relate to CO2 absorptions as 
depicted in the Figure above: What happens to atmospheric CO2 concentration?”). In a 
within-subjects design, participants submitted their answers first in a multiple choice answer 
format (e.g., “CO2 emissions would have to be equal to CO2 absorptions”), and subsequently 
in the typical answer format, that is, by graphically sketching their answer into a coordinate 
system. Participants also completed SF tasks in a completely verbal format that avoided 
specific numeric information and did not entail coordinate systems at all (e.g., “CO2 emissions 
are currently twice as high as CO2 absorptions. Imagine that emission were reduced by 30%: 
How would atmospheric CO2 concentration react?”). Results showed that, first, for the exact 
same tasks and participants, solution rates were significantly reduced when participants 
needed to submit their answer graphically. An especially telling mistake was that in the 
typical stabilization task, participants who correctly gave the answer that the inflow would 
have to equal the outflow, sketched two parallel and clearly separate lines—the typical pattern 
matching result. Moreover, the majority of participants arrived at the correct solution when 
the tasks were given in the verbal format. Our results thus suggest that (a) low solution rates 
found previously (“SF-failure”) can partially be explained by a format effect, namely how 
participants had to sketch their answer into coordinate systems (b) the typical pattern 
matching result can partially be explained by a format effect as well, namely how people tend 
to represent the relation “equal to” as parallel lines; and (c) the majority of participants is able 
to come to correct conclusions about the behavior of SF systems when presented in verbal 
formats. 
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Making sense of dynamic systems: How our understanding of stocks and flows 
depends on a global perspective: Manuscript 2 
 
 The results of Manuscript 1 suggest that the original task format contained error-prone 
aspects, thereby underestimating people’s true understanding of dynamic systems. When these 
error-prone aspects were avoided, the majority of participants was able to correctly answer 
questions about SF systems that were structurally identical to the ones used in previous 
research (see Sterman, 2008, 2011). However, there might be an additional explanation for the 
increased solution rates: It seems plausible that by our framing of the verbal questions where 
we explicitly referred to relations between system elements (e.g., “CO2 emissions are 
currently twice as high as CO2 absorptions”), we might have changed people’s representations 
of the task from a concrete level of isolated elements to a more abstract level of over-time 
relations between elements. Similarly, Fischer and Degen (2012) found that solution rates 
varied drastically as a function of minor changes in surface details of the task format. A 
possible interpretation is that in the original task format, participants focus on peripheral 
details that are irrelevant to the system’s central feature, its SF structure. Moreover, this study 
showed that in the original task format, participants might have been biased to calculate, 
rather than to try to abstract the system structure. It is the aim of Manuscript 2 to specifically 
investigate the hypothesis that processing information on different levels of abstraction affects 
system understanding. We (Fischer & Gonzalez, 2015) hypothesized that more concrete 
processing of isolated system elements is detrimental, whereas abstract processing of 
overarching patterns is beneficial for system understanding.  
 What do different levels of abstraction refer to? Burgoon, Henderson and Markman 
(2013) argue that the term abstraction has been defined and used in a number of different 
ways in psychological literature. However, the authors also argue there is a common theme in 
the different usages of abstraction, namely that it refers to a “process of identifying a set of 
invariant central characteristics” (p.502). Given this definition, more abstract thinking is 
related to an act of information reduction that entails identifying stable, defining aspects; less 
abstract thinking in turn would be related to focusing on more variant, peripheral details. As 
the word ab-straction already implies, going up increasing higher level of abstraction implies 
leaving away, disregarding these increasingly variant properties. When abstraction is studied 
in paradigms employing visual perception, often hierarchical figures are used that consist of a 
global configuration made up of local elements. Usually the term global-local processing is 
 16 
used to refer to processing the stimulus at different levels of the stimulus structure. I will thus 
use the terms abstract as opposed to concrete processing when speaking of information 
processing on different levels of abstraction in general, and the terms global-local processing 
mostly when referring to the processing of visual stimuli at different levels of the stimulus 
structure in particular.  
 It is possible to attend to stimuli in two fundamentally different ways: one can attend 
to events by focusing on elements, or by focusing on groups of structurally related elements. 
In Psychology, this idea received much attention since Navon introduced the distinction 
between global and local processing in his letter task (Navon, 1977, 2003; for a review, see 
Kimchi, 1992). In a series of experiments, Navon presented participants with hierarchically 
organized letters (large, global letters made up of smaller, local letters) and asked participants 
to name an auditory-presented letter. A converging result was that participants’ auditory 
discriminations were interfered by the global, but not the local letter. Navon concluded that 
visual perception is organized by global precedence, proceeding from global structures to 
more and more fine-grained details. More recent research suggests differences in global-local 
processing between groups (e.g., musicians, Stoesz, Jakobson, Kilgour & Lewicky, 2007; or 
people from collectivist cultures, Oishi et al., 2014), stable individual preferences (e.g., 
showing a test-retest stability of r=.79 over 7-10 days, Dale & Arnell, 2013), and differences 
caused by experimental manipulation (e.g., by having participants repeatedly name global or 
local letters, Macrae & Lewis, 2002).  Most important for the present hypothesis that more 
abstract processing should be beneficial for understanding dynamic systems, it was repeatedly 
found that experts process information more abstractly, focusing on stable patterns whereas 
novices process information more concretely, focusing on specific details that are readily 
observable (Ferguson-Hessler & DeJong, 1990; Hmelo, Holton, & Kolodner, 2000; Hmelo-
Silver & Pfeffer, 2004).  
 For example, when asked to answer questions about the weather system given weather 
maps, expert meteorologists compared to novices tend to integrate information more, and tend 
to focus less on specific elements of the maps (Trafton, Marshall, Mintz & Tricket, 2002). 
This kind of expert reasoning appears to hold across a range of research and domains. Expert 
teachers formed more connections among pieces of information when judging photos of class 
room interactions, and they categorized them more in meaningful problem units than novices 
(Carter et al., 1988), and expert biologists integrated structural, functional, and behavioral 
elements when freely drawing and explaining an aquaculture, capturing the global, dynamic 
interdependencies of the system, while hobbyists focused on perceptually available, static 
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components of the system, providing more local, specific, and focused explanations of the 
system (Hmelo-Silver & Pfeffer, 2004). Taken together, novices seem to focus more on 
confined, readily observable and highly specific properties of the system, whereas experts 
tend to build mental models around integrated, less salient and less specific properties of the 
system, organizing incoming information more around stable and overarching patterns. In a 
word, experts compared to novices seem to process systems on a more abstract level. 
 In Manuscript 2, we test the idea that more abstract processing is beneficial for 
understanding SF systems, not only because of expert-novice processing differences, but also 
because—given the definition of abstract processing as defining invariant central 
characteristics—in the case of a dynamic system, this should entail defining the system 
structure. “Different” SF systems behave according to their common and invariant property—
the SF structure—be the elements CO2 molecules in the atmosphere or customers in a 
department store. In one sense, it is thus trivial or even analytic to say that “abstract 
processing” should be beneficial for system understanding—if abstract processing simply 
refers to inducing the system structure, and induction of the system structure is then used as a 
measure for “system understanding”. In order to test the hypothesis that system understanding 
benefits from abstract processing in a non-trivial way, one should find ways how abstract 
processing transfers from processing of the dynamic system to processing of another task. 
 We propose a structural and cognitive correspondence between hierarchical figures 
and dynamic systems: Similarly to how hierarchical figures consist of a global property that 
does not inhere in isolated elements (but in their spatial relations), the behavior a dynamic 
system as a whole does not inhere in isolated elements (but in their structural relations). In 
that sense, then, abstract processing of dynamic systems is to global processing of hierarchical 
figures as concrete processing of dynamic systems is to local processing of hierarchical 
figures: Similarly to how one may attend to isolated letters in the Navon task, one may attend 
to isolated elements of dynamic systems, and similarly to how one may attend to groups of 
structurally related letters, one may attend to groups of structurally related system elements. 
In short, a dynamic system may be seen as a structured unit very much in the same sense as a 
hierarchical figure. If this fundamental claim holds, people who tend to focus on the 
constituent elements of a hierarchical figure should fail at inducing the system behavior, while 
people who tend to focus on the global configuration of a hierarchical figure should succeed 
at inducing the system behavior. 
 More abstract as opposed to more concrete processing might not only exist as a 
relatively stable, individual preference for information processing, it might also be possible to 
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treat abstract processing as a cognitive process that can be induced in participants. Cognitive 
processes, the manipulation, transformation, or reorganization of content (Janiszewski & 
Wyer, 2014), can differ in accessibility, depending on what processes have been used recently 
(Gollwitzer, 1999). Currently used operations are more likely to be highly activated, and are 
therefore more likely to be re-used for processing of novel information (Freitas, Gollwitzer & 
Trope, 2004; Shen & Wyer, 2008). That is, processes that are activated through previous tasks 
have a higher probability to be activated in subsequent tasks. Importantly, as opposed to 
content priming such as semantic priming, goal, affective or behavioral priming, such  
procedural priming effects are supposed to be content-free (for a review, see Janiszewski & 
Wyer, 2014).  
 To demonstrate effects of procedural priming, one needs to show that a cognitive 
process that is used in one task is more likely to be reused in a subsequent task, and this 
increased likelihood needs to hold even if the second task is unrelated content-wise. An often-
replicated example of process priming is structural priming. Structural priming refers to the 
increased likelihood of using a syntactic structure in a sentence because of its structural 
parallels to previously encountered sentences. Such repetition occurs in the absence of 
similarities in content or sound (Bock, 1986; for a review, see Pickering & Ferreira, 2008). 
That is, structural similarities are transferred from one sentence to the next, while surface 
constituent similarities are disregarded. In one of the earliest demonstration of structural 
priming (Bock, 1986), participants repeated prime sentences and then freely described target 
pictures that were unrelated content-wise. Results showed that participants were more likely 
to reuse the target syntactic structure of the prime sentence rather than an alternative structure 
(such as an active rather than a passive voice). In another study, participants listened to 
auditorily presented sentences with or without a target structure and then described aloud a 
given picture in one sentence. Results again showed that that the target-primed condition used 
the target structure more often than the alternative-primed baseline, implying structural 
persistence across modalities (Bock, Dell, Chang & Onishi, 2007).  
 This shortly reviewed evidence suggests that it is possible to activate structural aspects 
of language such that they are more accessible and more likely to be used in subsequent 
sentences, while disregarding semantic and sound of the sentences. In Manuscript 2, we 
(Fischer & Gonzalez, 2015) propose the existence of a similar effect for the processing of 
dynamic systems: That it is possible to procedurally prime participants with a semantically 
unrelated, previous task such that they are more likely to attend to the structure of the system 
as opposed to its elements in a subsequent SF task. 
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In Manuscript 2, we test whether and how global-local processing of hierarchical 
stimuli transfers to processing of dynamic systems, affecting systems understanding. To 
measure systems understanding, participants (N=148) completed an often-used SF task, the 
department store (DS) task (e.g., Cronin et al., 2009). We found that (a) individual differences 
in processing hierarchical figures (Kimchi-Palmer figures) was related to understanding of the 
DS task such that people who tended to focus on isolated elements in hierarchical figures 
were less likely to understand the system’s overall behavior than people who tended to focus 
on the global structure of the figures; (b) individual differences in processing the Kimchi-
Palmer figures were related to correlation heuristic use such that local processors tended to 
use the heuristic more than global processors; (c) the format of the system affects system 
understanding such that understanding is increased when the answer format highlights 
relations between elements as opposed to isolated elements; and (d) procedurally priming 
participants affected system understanding such that participants who repeatedly focused on 
visual displays in their entirety were more likely to correctly infer the system’s behavior 
compared to participants who focused on specific details of the same displays. These results 
converge towards global-local processing as a cognitive explanation for when and why SF 
failure and correlation heuristic use does, and does not occur. 
  
 
  
 
 
   
 !
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When high working memory capacity and using more training information is 
and is not beneficial for predicting non-linear processes: Manuscript 3 
 
The previous chapters were mainly concerned with how, in general, interaction 
between system elements may lead to system properties that do not inhere in the elements 
(such as the number of people in a department store increasing even though the number of 
people entering and leaving are both decreasing). What has been largely disregarded, 
however, is the specific property of non-linearity that is a property of many real-world 
systems (Wu & David, 2002). In non-linear systems, interaction between system elements 
produces non-additive effects—effects that have a numerical value that is not equal to the sum 
or difference of their component parts—so that the output of the system is not directly 
proportional to its input. Given our strong temptation to apply linear prediction strategies and 
proportional thinking to non-linear environments (for a review, see Van Dooren, Janssens, De 
Bock & Verschaffel, 2008), however, predicting non-linear developments is usually less 
accurate than predicting linear developments (for a review, see Busemeyer, Byun, DeLosh & 
McDaniel, 1997), and typically leads to a dramatic underestimation of non-linear dynamics 
known as trend-damping (Harvey & Bolger, 1996; see Armstrong, 2006 for a review).  
Inaccuracy of people's predictions is especially pronounced in the case of exponential 
developments, a fundamental class of highly nonlinear processes in nature. People typically 
underestimate the rate of exponential change by far, sometimes underestimating the system’s 
output by up to 90% (Wagenaar & Sagaria, 1975; Wagenaar & Timmers, 1979). This typical 
misconception of exponential time series was found in various modes of data presentation, 
such as numerical, graphical (Wagenaar & Sagaria, 1975), or directly observable (Ebersbach, 
Lehner, Resing & Wilkening, 2008), and for different semantic embeddings (Keren, 1983; 
Kemp, 1984). While it might seem like a rather academic problem to anticipate exponential 
developments, it is also of high practical importance for accurate reasoning about the 
prerequisites of climate change and its future development: Three important greenhouse 
gases—carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane—have increased exponentially since 
approximately 1800, the time of the industrial revolution (IPCC, 2014).  
 An explanation for people’s typical underestimation of nonlinear processes was 
delivered in previous research (DeLosh, Busemeyer & McDaniel, 1997) arguing that the 
majority of people adhere to exemplar-based, linear predictions irrespective of the function 
form—that is, even in the case of exponential functions. In the present manuscript, I address 
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the question of how people predict exponential functions, arguing that people do not simply 
use exemplar-based, linear prediction strategies in general. Rather, people seem to gather 
some, albeit ill-calibrated, rule knowledge depicting the structural properties of exponential 
processes.  
The issue of how participants extrapolate has long been the subject of debate. Rule-
based models assume that during training, participants abstract a global rule describing the 
ensemble of training information (McDaniel & Busemeyer, 2005). The process of rule-
abstraction is comparable to the formation of a regression equation, as participants use the 
feedback provided to adjust the coefficients of their rule (Kwantes et al., 2012; Bott & Heit, 
2004). Linear exemplar-based models such as, most prominently, the hybrid extrapolation 
association model (EXAM; DeLosh et al., 1997) propose exemplar-based learning together 
with generic linear extrapolation. Participants store single predictor-criterion instances in 
memory, and when presented with a novel predictor, they retrieve the two nearest-matching 
training instances and extrapolate linearly through these two stimuli. Linear exemplar-based 
models were highly successful in previous model tests, accounting better for participants’ 
extrapolations than rule-based models (Kalish, Lewandowsky & Kruschke, 2004).  
People might be more likely to use the cognitively more taxing strategy of rule-
induction compared to linearity heuristics (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007), when this provides a 
prediction advantage: In the case of highly non-linear processes. In previous research, 
however, the most non-linear function class—the exponential—was only represented by an 
asymptotic growth function, that is, an increasingly linear processes (see Figure 3; DeLosh et 
al., 1997). The asymptotic nature of this function could have biased participants to use 
EXAM, simply because its trajectory can be well-approximated linearly compared to the 
increasingly nonlinear trajectory of the prototypical case of accelerating exponential growth. 
It therefore seems plausible that the use of asymptotic stimuli lead to an overgeneralization of 
the validity of EXAM, and that when accelerating functions are used, more people deviate 
from generic linear prediction models. 
 Importantly, in contrast to studies that tested specific model instantiations (DeLosh et 
al., 1997; McDaniel & Busemeyer, 2005), we aimed at investigating strategy-use by testing 
basic assumptions that most models within one class (linear exemplar-based versus rule-
based) share. This approach allows for conclusions about not only one model, but about 
several models sharing the same basic assumptions. Prediction accuracy cannot necessarily 
distinguish between rule-and exemplar-based strategies—rules can be ill-calibrated and still 
be rules. Predictions’ (non-) linearity cannot decisively distinguish either, since exemplar-
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based models incorporate linear predictions, but when using rules, people typically integrate 
information linearly as well (for a review, see Brehmer, 1994). Rather, rule-based predictions 
are information-intensive in that they integrate a range of training data describing the overall 
function form; exemplar-based and hybrid predictions are information-frugal in that they rely 
on the closest-matching training exemplars only. To investigate strategy-use, we compared 
how participants extrapolate a given exponential function compared to a quadratic function 
that is identified on the two exemplars most similar to the extrapolation region. Each function 
pair is thus identical in exemplars most similar to extrapolation values, but differs in rules. 
Consequently, information-frugal models predict identical extrapolation for each pair, 
whereas information-intensive models predict differing extrapolations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Exponential stimulus function with an increasingly linear trajectory as used in 
previous research (DeLosh et al., 1997). 
 
 While these arguments address how people extrapolate in general, it seems reasonable 
to speculate that individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) might influence 
strategy-choice in function learning. First, a growing body of literature demonstrates the 
importance of WMC for accuracy and speed of learning in a structurally similar task: 
categorization of qualitative stimuli (Craig & Lewandowsky, 2012; Lewandowsky et al., 
2012). Second, it seems theoretically plausible that WMC should play a key role for the 
induction of rules given that participants need to memorize previous cue and criterion values, 
estimate their differences, and update the weights of their derived rule accordingly. These 
processes arguably encompass storage and transformation—key facets of WM (Oberauer, 
Süß, Schulze, Wilhelm & Wittmann, 2000). In categorization and multiple-cue judgments, 
involvement of WMC is known to be high when more cues need to be considered, or more 
complex rules need to be abstracted (Juslin, Karlsson & Olson, 2008; Mata et al., 2012). 
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Reasoning by analogy to the conceptually similar case of function-learning, involvement of 
WMC should be especially pronounced in the present case of non-linear functions that 
involves integrating a range of cues into potentially highly complex rules (e.g., exponential). 
Third, a connection between extrapolation strategies and memory in general has long been 
assumed given that participants need to memorize the previous states of the process in order 
to forecast its future states (Mackinnon & Wearing, 1991). Despite these compelling reasons, 
the relationship between WMC and extrapolation is still very unclear and had (at the time of 
the pretests described below) not been investigated at all. 
 In two pretests (n=45 each) that will be described together given their strong 
conceptual relation, we systematically investigated the influence of asymptotic versus 
accelerating exponential growth and decay functions on strategy-use in a typical function-
learning paradigm (e.g., see Kwantes et al., 2012). The first test employed prototypical 
exponential growth and decay functions (i.e., accelerating increasing and asymptotic 
decreasing functions), the second test employed inverted exponential functions (i.e., 
asymptotic increasing and accelerating decreasing). In both tests, function shape (accelerating 
vs. asymptotic) was varied between, and function direction (increasing vs. decreasing) was 
varied within participants. In the second tests, we also investigated the influence of WMC 
(assessed with digit span forward and backwards) on strategy-choice and prediction accuracy 
in an exploratory manner. We expected participants high in WMC to be able to consider and 
manipulate more training information and thus to be more likely to abstract a rule describing 
the function trajectory. Consequently, high compared to low WMC individuals’ prediction 
strategies should (a) deviate more from exemplar-based, linear predictions, and (b) be more 
accurate. 
 Participants were told that they were to learn how a stock has developed over time 
using feedback as a guide, and that they were to predict the further development of that stock. 
The specific nature of the stock was not presented to avoid confounding with domain-specific 
background knowledge. During the training blocks of each process, successive time values 
were presented as numbers, and participants entered their prediction of the stock value as a 
number into an input box (see Kwantes et al., 2012). Participants were then given feedback in 
the form of the correct stock at that time (again presented as a number; functions were not 
shown graphically in order for participants to have to rely on WM). During the testing block, 
participants predicted the stock for new time values without feedback.  
 We found promising connections between WMC and strategy-choice. WMC was 
connected to the absolute prediction difference within function pairs for the asymptotic 
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increasing function, r(43) = .28, p = .03, but not for the decreasing function, r(43) = -.10, p = 
.26. As opposed to the majority of participants, for participates highest in WMC (> 75 
percentile), predictions of the asymptotic increasing function (M = 2350, SD = 75) differed 
from predictions of its matching quadratic function (M = 2100, SD = 27), F(1,171) = 10.25,  p  
= .002, partial η2 = .06. At least for the increasing function, WMC thus seems to be connected 
to strategy-choice: high compared to low WMC participants predicted different trajectories 
for an exponential as opposed to its matching quadratic function, suggesting that they 
integrated more training information into their prediction strategies than assumed by 
information-frugal models. 
 Interestingly, however, the connection between WMC and prediction accuracy was 
completely at odds with our expectations: Albeit using more information-intensive strategies, 
high compared to low WMC individuals’ predictions were less accurate for the asymptotic 
growth function (again no significant relationship for the decreasing function). As Figure 4 
shows, high WMC individuals systematically overshot when prediction the asymptotic 
growth function, thereby apparently over-applying its steep training trajectory to its (flat) 
extrapolation region. Low WMC individuals’ simple exemplar-based strategies, in contrast, 
did not significantly deviate from the correct function. 
 
 
Figure 4. Results from a pretest to Manuscript 3: Mean predictions for low (<75% 
percentile) compared to high (>75% percentile) WMC individuals after training with an 
asymptotically increasing compared to its matching quadratic function. Dotted line represents 
the correct function value. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 Given the promising and interesting findings from the pretests on how WMC relates to 
prediction strategy-use and accuracy, for the main study, we systematically investigated this 
relationship for the whole set of exponential functions of the basic form 
 
 25 
! ! = !!"#$ ∙ ! ∙ !! !!"#$∙! ∙(!!!)) + ! 
 
where asign, bsign ∈ {1, -1} and  a, b, d, e ∈ ℝ and x ∈ {0 ... 100}. Variable x is the 
input, asign determines whether the function is increasing or decreasing and bsign determines 
whether the function is exponentially accelerating or asymptoting (i.e., decelerating) towards 
a constant. Given results from the pretests, we expected high WMC individuals to be more 
likely to deviate from simple exemplar-based accounts, employing information-intensive 
prediction strategies, which should pay off in highly non-linear (accelerating) functions, but 
might also lead to systematic overshoot in increasingly linear, (asymptotic) functions. In a 
word, it was the aim of Manuscript 3 to systematically assess prediction strategy-use and 
accuracy and how they relate to WMC in environments that differ in their degree of non-
linearity. 
In Manuscript 3, we systematically investigated whether the shape of the to-be 
predicted process influences prediction strategy-use, and how WMC (assessed with digit span 
forward and backward and letter-number sequences) relates to prediction strategy-use and 
accuracy for the complete set of basic exponential function types (accelerating, asymptoting, 
increasing, decreasing). In a function-learning experiment (N=296), we found that (a) 
predictions of approx. half of participants differed within function pairs, suggesting a basic 
understanding of exponential versus quadratic processes; (b) high compared to low WMC 
individuals were more likely to deviate from exemplar-based, linear prediction strategies, and 
tended to integrate more training information into their predictions than assumed by these 
models; and this tendency was related to (c) higher training calibration in all processes, and to 
higher prediction accuracy in quadratic and accelerating processes; but also to (d) worse 
prediction accuracy in the asymptotic processes compared to low WMC individuals’ 
exemplar-based, linear prediction strategies. These results suggest that exemplar-based, linear 
predictions are not a generic strategy as was found previously; rather, many participants seem 
to be able to capture the fundamental properties of even exponential functions. And given that 
higher calibration to training data together with lower generalizability to novel stimuli is a 
typical result for algorithms that overfit the training data compared to simpler algorithms, 
these results suggest that high WMC individuals were prone to overfitting: In asymptotic 
processes, their more information-intensive strategies were outperformed by the simpler and 
more robust prediction strategies employed by low WMC individuals. 
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General Discussion 
 
 It was the goal of the present research was to shed light on the factors that shape 
systems understanding and prediction of non-linear developments. Of special interest was to 
determine factors that influence whether people predict the behavior of dynamic systems and 
non-linear processes by making use of the underlying structural regularities, or by employing 
simple, linear heuristics. There are eight core findings.  
 
 Summary of core findings 
First, the previously well-established finding that people show an intrinsic difficulty to infer 
correct mental models of SF systems—SF failure—is not a robust phenomenon. It rather 
seems to be a highly variable phenomenon that varies with minute changes in surface features 
of the task display. Second, people's ability to infer the structure of SF systems was 
underestimated, and correlation heuristic use was overestimated in previous research because 
the original task format contained error-prone aspects (construction of graphs into coordinate 
systems). Third, if a verbal task format is used that highlights relations between system 
elements, use of the correlation heuristic is reduced, and SF failure (almost) disappears. 
Fourth, there is a correspondence between the way people process hierarchical figures and the 
way they process dynamic systems:  people who tend to focus on elements in hierarchical 
figures tend to use the correlation heuristic more, and tend not to understand the overall 
system behavior; people who tend to focus on the global structure in hierarchical figures, tend 
to use the correlation heuristic less, and tend to understand the system behavior. Fifth, 
abstraction of the system structure is a cognitive process that can be induced with a 
semantically unrelated task, influencing SF failure in a subsequent task. Sixth, people adopt 
their prediction strategy to the demands of the environment: In environments that can be well-
approximated linearly, more people use information-frugal heuristic strategies than in highly 
non-linear environments that demand more information-intensive strategies. Seventh, rule-
based prediction strategies may not always lead to higher prediction accuracy compared to 
exemplar-based, linear prediction heuristics as was implicitly assumed previously (McDaniel, 
Cahill, Robbins & Wiener, 2014). Rather, rule-based predictions are more accurate compared 
to linear heuristics in accelerating environments, but are outperformed by linear heuristics in 
asymptotic environments. And eighth, high WMC individuals tend to capture better the 
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underlying structural regularities of non-linear environments, leading to better prediction 
accuracy in complex, accelerating environments; in simple, asymptotic environments, 
however, this tendency leads to overfitting to training data, and to inferior prediction accuracy 
compared to low WMC individuals’ computationally simpler exemplar-based strategies. 
 To assess people’s understanding of the SF structure in the original task format, 
participants needed to submit their answers by sketching graphs into coordinate systems. As 
Fischer and Degen (2012) and Manuscript 1 (Fischer, Degen & Funke, 2015) showed, 
however, this answer format caused specific problems in itself, leading to a considerable 
underestimation of people’s true understanding of the SF structure. While most participants 
were able to correctly answer questions about the system behavior when submitting their 
answers in a multiple-choice answer format, solution rates were reduced by approximately 
40% when submitting this same answer by sketching the respective graph. An especially 
interesting finding was that even the correlation heuristic can partially by explained by the 
original answer format. After giving the (correct!) verbal answer that in-and outflow need to 
be identical, 22% of our participants sketched two parallel and clearly separate (>0.5cm) 
lines. This answer pattern coincides with the typical finding of linear extrapolation from 
previous developments of the flows (pattern matching), suggesting that for a part of 
participants, the repeated finding of pattern matching solutions in previous research cannot be 
interpreted as a sign of wrong mental models about the system structure. In other words, it’s 
not only that “poor understanding of accumulation leads to serious error on reasoning about 
climate change” (Sterman, 2008, p.532), but that, at least for some, poor understanding of the 
construction of graphs leads to serious error in the original SF task format: Both the SF failure 
in general, and the pattern matching heuristic in particular can in parts be explained by a 
format effect. 
It was found previously that the majority of participants does not acquire an 
understanding of the structural relations of non-linear developments, that is, they do not 
abstract rules describing the function form (DeLosh, Busemeyer & McDaniel, 1997; 
McDaniel, Dimperio, Griego & Busemeyer, 2009). Given that rules can be ill-calibrated and 
still be rules, in Manuscript 3, we did not use prediction accuracy as a measure for rule-
induction (McDaniel et al., 2014), but compared predictions of an exponential function to that 
of a quadratic twin function identified at the training exemplars most similar to extrapolation 
values. In line with the typical misperception of exponentiality (Wagenaar & Sagaria, 1975; 
Wagenaar & Timmers, 1979), participants deviated from the correct exponentially 
accelerating functions; approximately half of participants did, however, differentiate between 
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exponential functions compared to their quadratic twins—a result that is clearly at odds with 
the assumptions of linear exemplar-based accounts. Moreover, these participants deviated 
from simple linear predictions in the direction of the correct function, implying that they must 
have acquired a basic understanding of exponentially accelerating as opposed to quadratic 
functions. In so far as the abstraction of global features of the to-be-predicted function is a 
sign of rule-induction, we argue that participants do acquire rule knowledge (albeit ill-
calibrated) about exponential as opposed to quadratic functions. In other words, not acquiring 
a correct understanding is not tantamount to acquiring no understanding.  
Concerning the involvement of WMC on extrapolation in non-linear environments, our 
finding that high WMC fosters accuracy of predictions in quadratic and accelerating 
environments is largely in line with previous results stressing the importance of WMC for 
mathematical skill in general (Alloway & Passolunghi, 2011; DeStefano & LeFevre, 2004), 
and categorization performance in particular (Craig & Lewandowsky, 2012; Hoffmann, von 
Helversen & Rieskamp, 2014; Lewandowsky, Yang, Newell & Kalish, 2012; McDaniel, 
Cahill, Robbins & Wiener, 2014). To our knowledge, the present results are the first to show, 
however, that the beneficial influence of high WMC is only part of the story: When a simple 
prediction strategy was available (asymptotic environments), high WMC individuals’ 
tendency to derive more complex rules was outperformed by low WMC individuals’ tendency 
to rely on exemplar-based linearity heuristics. Analogously to how in multiple-cue judgment, 
it was argued that heuristics succeed when their structure matches the structure of the 
environment (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007), in the present case of function-learning, linearity 
heuristics thus achieved optimal prediction accuracy when they matched the shape of the 
process in the extrapolation region. 
 
 What factors influence rule-induction versus heuristics use? 
 Investigating the determinants of whether people induce the structural relations 
underlying SF systems and non-linear processes, we tested factors in the task display and 
environment, and factors within the individual. Although it might seem more intuitive at first 
sight that describing and processing dynamic systems abstractly should hinder understanding, 
the present results on both individual differences and task format effects suggest the opposite: 
abstraction seems to foster dynamic systems understanding. 
 Fischer, Degen and Funke (2015) found that when presented in a verbal format, the 
majority of participants was able to correctly answer questions about determinants of system 
behavior, suggesting that they must have acquired a correct mental model about its structural 
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relations. Error-prone aspects of the task format artificially reduced solution rates by 
approximately 40%, and can therefore not fully account for the improvement in solution rates 
from the original paradigm (16% in Fischer & Degen, 2012, which is largely in line with 
Sterman, 2011) to the verbal tasks, however (approx. 85% in Manuscript 1). We therefore 
investigated an additional factor: That by referring to relations between elements in the verbal 
tasks, we changed participants processing of the given system from concrete, local processing 
of isolated system elements to a more abstract, global level of the system structure.  
 A later experiment specifically designed to test that hypothesis largely confirmed our 
assumption on both the task, and the individual level (Manuscript 2). Concerning the former, 
we not only replicated the previous findings that SF failure and correlation heuristic use 
appears when isolated elements are highlighted in the task, and that SF failure and correlation 
heuristic use largely disappear when referring to relations between elements; we were also 
able to induce processing of elements as opposed to gestalts with a semantically unrelated 
task (maps task). Similarly, on the individual level, we found that those who tend to focus on 
overall gestalts as opposed to constituent elements in a hierarchical figures task, tend to use 
the correlation heuristic less, and tend to come to correct conclusions about the overall system 
behavior. In sum, the present results converge on the conclusion that that reasoning on a 
higher level of abstraction reduces heuristic use, and fosters understanding of the structural 
relations of dynamic systems. 
 Previous attempts to increase understanding of dynamic systems in general and the 
climate system in particular focused on increasing analytical thinking, and motivation to 
deliberate (Cronin et al., 2009; Newell, 2012). For example, in a series of five experiments 
trying to increase people’s understanding of basic dynamic systems presented in pen-and-
paper form (similar to those used in Manuscript 2), Newell (2012) hypothesized that 
overcoming heuristics required more deliberative thinking and consequently encouraged more 
detailed processing in participants. However, increased deliberation failed to increase 
understanding of the system, and also failed to reduce correlation heuristic use for the 
majority of participants. As the present results suggest, the opposite strategy appears more 
promising: People’s understanding of dynamic system cannot be increased by more detailed 
and analytical processing. On the contrary, it can be increased by more global processing. 
Instead of teaching calculus, it seems more promising to teach strategies of abstraction and 
pattern recognition; instead of encouraging more detailed processing, it seems more 
promising to encourage more abstract processing. That is, it seems more promising to teach 
people to focus less on the details of a dynamic system, not more.  
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In line with previous results (McDaniel et al., 2014), we showed that WMC is 
associated with integrating more training information into prediction strategies. High 
compared to low WMC individuals were more likely to differentiate between function twins, 
that is, to extrapolate using rules that describe the overall function form. While the present 
research and arguments focused on how the simultaneous storage and transformation facet of 
WM should allow for retrieval and updating of information relevant for rule-induction, it was 
more specifically argued that WM helps building relations between elements in order to 
establish structures (Oberauer, Süß, Wilhlem, Wittman, 2003). The WM facet of coordination 
of elements into structures is thought to provide access to information elements to abstract 
novel relations and structure, or, as the authors put it: “WM provides access to varying 
elements by placing them in a common coordinate system.” (p. 170). Albeit speculative in 
nature, our result suggest that the downside of such access might be that the higher one’s 
WMC, the more elements are placed into the cognitive coordinate system, so that the 
resulting function gets more and more complex (e.g. in the form of polynomials of 
increasingly higher degrees) – and potentially too complex to generalize well. 
 
 Previous explanations for systems (mis-)understanding and how they relate to 
abstract processing 
 In previous research, a multitude of reasons was discussed for people’s difficulties 
with dynamic systems. It was argued, first, that the behavior of dynamic systems is difficult to 
understand due to high working memory demand (Hmelo-Silver & Azevedo, 2006; Hmelo-
Silver, Marathe & Liu, 2007). WM demand is supposed to be high because dynamic systems 
contain several interacting events, whose behavior participants need to simulate. Second, it 
was argued that many people fail at understanding the workings of dynamic systems because 
they tend to focus on what is directly visible (Hmelo, Holton, & Kolodner, 2000), even 
though many relevant structures and processes of dynamic systems are not directly observable 
(Ferrari & Chi, 1998). Third, people were found to have a preference for single and linear 
causality (Jacobson, 2001). Such a preference for simple and direct causality is critical since 
many dynamic systems possess interconnected, nonlinear, causality such as feedback loops. 
Fourth and lastly, the properties of emergent higher-level parts are difficult to understand 
because cause-effect relationships are not obvious; emergent properties were therefore even 
called ontologically distinct (Hmelo-Silver, Marathe & Liu, 2007). 
 Albeit highly different in nature, the previously found reasons for people’s difficulties 
in understanding dynamic systems are largely in line with the present result of a need for 
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abstraction. WM demand is high when a great number of interrelated variables need to be 
examined. That is, WM demand is high if people focus on isolated lower-level elements of the 
system. If people focus on higher-level elements of the system that by definition consist of 
fewer elements, WM demand should be lower. Summarizing the relevant structures of the 
system in more abstract terms should thus be economic in terms of cognitive resources. 
Second, the finding that people tend to focus on what is directly observable might well be 
connected to people focusing on lower-level aspects of the system since it was argued that 
lower-level properties tend to be those properties that are more readily observable (for a 
review, see Burgoon et al., 2013). Instructing people in methods of abstraction could thus 
alleviate problems with a focus on what is readily observable. Third and fourth, people’s 
preference for single causality and their difficulties with emergent properties can be 
understood as difficulties arising from reasoning over isolated elements, as opposed to 
interactions between elements. As Manuscript 2 shows, if people adopt a more abstract view 
on systems by reasoning over relations between elements, then difficulties with emerging 
properties can be avoided. In sum, previously found explanations for people’s difficulties with 
dynamic systems may seem diverge; they may, however, be summarized under the idea of a 
need for abstraction.  
 
 Application to climate change: Barriers to understanding and potential solutions  
 In search for an explanation of the public’s wavering opinion on climate change 
(Dunlap, 2013; Lewandowsky, Oberauer & Gignac, 2013; Pidgeon, 2012) given an increasing 
scientific consensus on the existence of climate change, its human influence, and its risks 
(Solomon, 2007; IPCC, 2014), it was argued that easily accessible but isolated cues might 
influence people's opinion of climate change (Egan & Mullin, 2012; Hamilton & Stampone, 
2013;). For example, people’s belief in the existence of climate change is known to increase 
when the day of the study is perceived as warmer than usual (Li, Johnson & Zaval, 2011), or 
simply when participants are seated in a room with dead indoor plants (Gueguen, 2012). 
Similarly, the APA task force on psychology and global climate change summarized the 
barriers they had identified to understanding climate change: “Climate change is a trend in 
averages and extremes of temperature, precipitation, and other parameters that are embedded 
in a lot of variability, making it very difficult to identify from personal experience. People 
often falsely attribute unique events to climate change and also fail to detect changes in 
climate” (Swim et al., 2011, p.33). Specifically, the report details four major problems:  
 1. Achieving appropriate understanding of climate change is difficult. 
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 2. Climate change is difficult to experience. 
 3. Climate change risks are perceived as uncertain and as being in the future. 
 4. The costs of mitigation are certain and immediate. 
 
 As the present results suggest, relying on isolated, "unique" cues may not only 
influence people’s opinion of climate change; it may also influence people’s understanding of 
its SF structure. Moreover, by stating that climate change is an aggregate, mirrored in trends 
and averages rather than single incidents, the report implicitly taps on the distinction between 
isolated lower-and aggregated higher-level system elements, and the confusion thereof, as a 
major challenge. Taken together, the present results may offer potential solutions to some of 
the problems summarized in the task force report, specifically to (1) and (2).  
 Concerning the first challenge, lack of understanding of the climate, Manuscript 1 
shows how understanding of the climate as a dynamic system can be enhanced: By reducing 
overly scientific barriers to understanding when communicating to (or, rather: with) the 
general public. Thus, one suggestion on how to deal with the first challenge can be: 
Increase understanding of the climate and conditions for climate change by 
 highlighting its underlying SF structure in simple words: “We are living in a global 
bath-tub!”  
 This can be achieved by two different means: First, by verbally referring attention to 
the SF structure, and specifically, how climate change is determined through the relation 
between GHG emissions and absorptions. And second, if it is necessary to display 
information in graphical form, by considerably simplifying the respective graphs. For 
example, latest IPCC reports, including the summary for policymakers (Field et al., 2014; 
IPCC, 2014), make ample use of highly scientific graphs, mostly employing coordinate 
systems, scientific jargon, and percentage values. As Fischer & Degen (2012) showed, this 
may direct people's attention towards these highly salient elements, and bias them to try to 
calculate instead of trying to infer the (arguably relevant) system structure. As furthermore 
shown by Manuscript 1, scientific notations can pose a barrier to understanding in themselves, 
significantly reducing people’s ability to correctly infer the overall system behavior. Our 
results suggest to use qualitative rather than quantitative means to present the climate system. 
Whenever possible, we therefore propose to present key elements of the climate system in 
words. 
 The second challenge—that the climate as such cannot be experienced—mirrors that 
the climate is an abstract phenomenon, resting on a higher level of abstraction than those 
elements of the climate system that can be directly observed such as local temperature, 
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precipitation, or wind. Manuscript 2 showed that if attention is directed towards relations 
between lower-level system elements, people tend to understand the overall system behavior. 
Thus, one suggestion on how to deal with the second challenge can be: 
 Increase processing of the overall behavior of the climate system by inducing abstract 
as opposed to concrete processing of the system. 
 Manuscript 2 offers a solution of how this can be accomplished: The climate system 
should be described in such a way that people’s direction is guided towards overarching 
patterns and groups of elements, rather than isolated, singular elements. This is an aspect 
similar, albeit more refined than verbal description: A description of the climate system 
should highlight how specific elements relate to each other and how they jointly develop over 
a period of time. For example, one of the most prominent and widely received effects of 
climate change has been the melting of glaciers and ice sheets. It is important to direct 
attention not only to this isolated effect, but also to effects that arise though its connections to 
other system elements such as that the melting of sea ice leads to a reduction in surface 
reflectivity (albedo) and thereby to a greater absorption of solar radiation. More solar 
radiation will accelerate warming, thus increasing the melting of ice (IPCC, 2014).  
  
 Future research 
 The present results suggest that processing on a higher level of abstraction might 
foster systems understanding. Further research could further elucidate this connection 
between the degree of abstraction of information processing and dynamic systems 
understanding. It was argued that words are represented on a more abstract level than pictures 
because pictures are more concrete, specific, detailed, and contain observable features, 
whereas words contain an inherent abstraction, referring to concepts (in German, by the way, 
the formation of concepts is sometimes literally referred to as Begriffsbildung), and to a 
broader range of entities than a given picture (Amit, Algom, Trope & Liberman, 2008; Amit, 
Algom & Trope, 2009). By describing dynamic systems verbally without explicitly referring 
to relations between system elements, one could disentangle the potential influence of a 
salient system structure versus salient system elements and a potential influence of using 
words versus pictures. 
 Results of Manuscript 2 (Fischer & Gonzalez, 2015) suggest that it is possible to 
induce in participants the tendency to process information on a more or less abstract level, 
influencing systems understanding. Albeit demonstrating the success of such process priming, 
its exact nature remained unclear, however. Janiszewski and Wyer (2014) develop a model of 
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process priming as part of a spreading activation network (Anderson, 1983). Importantly, the 
network contains not only semantic nodes, but also process nodes. Each process node has a 
level of activation that depends on the frequency and regency of previous activation, and 
determines its likelihood of being re-activated. In this way, a previously activated process can 
be more accessible in a subsequent task, even if semantically unrelated (as was the case in 
Fischer & Gonzalez, 2015). Of course, these theoretical explanations remain speculative. 
Future research is needed to determine whether process priming as employed in the present 
research with the maps task indeed fostered more abstract processing of dynamic systems 
through increased activation. Given that the effect of process priming seemed short-lived, it 
seems important to include such process measures during completion of the system 
understanding task (and not thereafter). As more abstract categorization results in fewer 
categories, one possible approach might be to assess the numbers of categories participants 
use when solving the SF task, for example by having participants sort a set of systems 
elements into as many categories as they wish (see Lee & Ariely, 2006; Liberman, Sagristano 
& Trope, 2002).  
 Perhaps more importantly on a theoretical level, the processes that are induced with 
the maps task might not be cognitively equivalent to those measured with the Kimchi-Palmer 
figures, even though tasks both were related to system understanding in Manuscript 2. Albeit 
in many studies, the maps task (asking participants to focus on the shape of the map as a 
whole versus the specific location of its capital) was used to induce, and the Kimchi-Palmer 
figures were used to measure abstract as opposed to concrete processing (see Burgoon et al., 
2013, for a review), there might be important differences. First, as was argued above, 
hierarchical figures entail global properties that do not inhere in the elements, but are a 
function of the spatial relations of the elements (relational properties; Kimchi, 1992). The 
shape of a map, however, is not global in the sense of a relational property, at least not as a 
relational property of the location of its capital (relation to what?). Future research should 
thus try to disentangle the unique and incremental benefit of processing relational properties 
as opposed to simply broad properties for understanding dynamic systems.  
 Based on the present results, it seems plausible to speculate that, after increasingly 
abstract processing of dynamic systems, participants hold fundamentally different 
representations of the task in memory. Similarly, fuzzy-trace theory holds that people may 
hold different kinds of representations in memory on fuzzy-to-verbatim continua (Brainerd & 
Reyna, 1990; Reyna, 2012): superficial verbatim representations such as exact numbers and 
meaning-based gist representations, the “substance” of information. With respect to SF 
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systems, literal use of information might result in lowest level, categorical representations 
(e.g., “the inflow is five”), whereas increasingly abstract processing might result in ordinal 
(e.g., “in minute 5, the inflow is smaller than the outflow”) and increasingly higher-order 
representations (e.g., “overall, the inflow is bigger than the outflow”).  
 Concerning prediction of non-linear developments, Manuscript 3 showed that high 
WMC can be detrimental in the case of asymptotic functions that are well-predicted using 
simple exemplar-based strategies. Given the majority of studies showing that high WMC 
fosters categorization performance (e.g., Lewandowsky, 2011b, Lewandowsky et al., 2012), 
this is an interesting finding. We argued that high WMC individuals might actually be 
overfitting the training data, resulting in lower transfer accuracy compared to the simpler, 
information-frugal strategies employed by low WMC individuals. A benefit of simpler 
strategies could not be found in previous work as it employed functions that needed rule-
based strategies to achieve sufficient prediction accuracy (McDaniel et al., 2014). In order to 
investigate whether high WMC individuals’ tendency to overfit found in the present data is a 
more generic phenomenon that possibly even generalizes to other and different prediction 
tasks, one might assess learning versus transfer performance with tasks that can, and others 
that cannot be solved using simple exemplar-based strategies.  
While in function-learning experiments, understanding of structural cue-criterion 
relationships seems to hinge on over-time computation of rule parameters—and hence on 
WMC—radically different cognitive processes seem to be necessary for SF tasks: The present 
results speak for SF tasks as showing properties of an insight problem. For example, the result 
that a focus on Gestalts is beneficial for solution is a key feature of insight problems as 
opposed to analytic problems. As such, rearrangement of the problem parts is a decisive 
cognitive process, rendering an evident solution (“Aha! The inflow is bigger than the outflow, 
that is all I need to know”). If such rearranging is performed, no over-time calculations are 
necessary and therefore virtually no WMC resources would be needed (in fact, there is 
growing evidence that high WMC capacity might even impair the detection of simple 
solutions in insight problems; Wiley & Jarosz, 2012). Albeit predicting the output of SF 
systems and predicting the output of continuous developments may seem related from the 
outset, both tasks might differ radically in the cognitive processes and resources required. 
It might prove fruitful to make use of the rationale of global-local processing in the 
function-learning paradigm to study people's extrapolations of continuous processes such as 
atmospheric GHG concentration. It was found that people’s extrapolations of such processes 
are typically conservative, underestimating the rate of change in the data (Lewandowsky, 
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2011a), the well-established trend-damping phenomenon (Armstrong, 2006). Figures 
displaying over-time GHG concentration are hierarchical in that they consist of a global trend 
(for example, an overall increase) made up of local measuring points (showing, for example, a 
local or recent decrease). To understand the key message of the graph, one must understand 
all the points on the graph not as individual points, but as collections that define a cognitive 
structure (Halford, Baker, McCredden & Bain, 2005). In so far as global processing measures 
a tendency to perceive overarching patterns as opposed to isolated elements, global compared 
to local processing should result in radically different predictions, and in so far as global 
processing may be enhanced by the way the elements are displayed (e.g., the relative size and 
number of local elements, Kimchi & Palmer, 1982; Kimchi, 1992), one could possibly reduce 
typical misperceptions of these trends, an aspect that might be highly relevant for their 
communication in, first and foremost, IPCC reports. 
 
 Conclusion 
 Stock-flow structures and non-linear developments are inherent to many real-worlds 
systems and large-scale problems, ranging from national debts to global climate change. It 
therefore seems dramatic that previous research repeatedly found SF failure, people's seeming 
inability to understand SF structures. The present results suggest, however, that SF failure is 
not a generic and robust phenomenon, and identified factors that can explain when and why 
SF failure does—and does not—occur: SF failure can in parts be explained by a format effect, 
and in parts by whether people process the system on a concrete level of disparate elements or 
an abstract level of structural relations. While abstract processing seems to be beneficial for 
stock-flow understanding, this is not necessarily the case for predicting continuous processes: 
Inducing structural cue-criterion relations enhances prediction accuracy for environments 
with medium-to high difficulty structure in the extrapolation region, but is outperformed by 
simple exemplar-based strategies in environments that can be well-approximated linearly.  
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Abstract
Background. Stock-flow (SF) problems are ubiquitous in nature, ranging 
from the accumulation of water in a tub to the accumulation of CO2 in the 
atmosphere. However, research on SF failure repeatedly demonstrates that 
people have severe difficulties understanding even the most basic SF problems.
Purpose. This study tested the hypothesis that people’s understanding of 
SF problems depends on the presentation format used. Specifically, we 
expect SF failure to decrease when avoiding previously used scientific formats 
comprising coordinate systems and graphs, and SF problems are presented in 
verbal formats.
Method. Participants (N = 107) solved a range of different SF problems with 
experimentally varied presentation formats (verbal vs. graphic). We 
assessed fundamental understanding of graphs and graphical versus 
verbal production of stocks and in- and outflows.
Results. Solution rates show that (a) SF failure is at least partially caused by 
specifics of the presentation format used previously; (b) fundamental 
misunderstandings in the construction of graphs can explain previous 
findings; and (c) the majority of participants arrived at the correct 
solution when SF problems were presented verbally.
Conclusion. The present study indicates that people are able to solve SF problems 
when they are presented in accessible formats. This result bears implications 
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for simulation-based learning and assessment, and for the communication 
of SF problems.
Keywords
accessible formats, dynamic problems, graphs, inflow, misunderstandings, outflow, 
presentation format, scientific formats, stock and flow failure, stock-flow problems, 
understanding, verbal
It is a well-established finding that humans have severe difficulties understanding 
stock-flow (SF) dynamics, a phenomenon termed SF failure (see Sterman, 2011, for a 
recent review). Any system comprising a stock that accumulates over time and is 
dependent on given in- and outflows constitutes an SF system. The structure of SF 
systems is often explained by a bathtub analogy: The water level (stock) in a bathtub 
increases if the inflow of water through the faucet exceeds the outflow through the 
drain; the water level drops if the outflow exceeds the inflow. Consequently, our defi-
nition is that people have an understanding of the fundamental SF structure if they 
understand “that the stock rises when the inflow exceeds the outflow, and vice versa” 
(Cronin, Gonzalez, & Sterman, 2009, p. 9). Understanding SF systems is critical for 
many areas of life, ranging from everyday phenomena such as the accumulation of 
money in a bank account or the regulation of body weight, to more abstract scenarios 
such as the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere. Given the ubiquity of SF dynam-
ics, it seems perplexing and critical that people have great problems with regulating 
complex SF simulations containing many interrelated variables (Diehl & Sterman, 
1995), and even with understanding extremely simplified SF systems (Booth Sweeney 
& Sterman, 2000; Sterman & Booth Sweeney, 2002, 2007).
In this article, we argue, however, that the ability to solve SF problems is influenced 
by the way the problems are presented (presentation format henceforth), and that pre-
vious research used potentially error-inducing formats. Similarly, research has demon-
strated that displaying isomorphic problems in different presentation formats can have 
a dramatic impact on problem-solving performance, such as on the Wason selection 
task (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985), the Tower of Hanoi (Kotovsky, Hayes, & Simon, 
1985), deductive reasoning (O’Brien, Noveck, Davidson, & Fisch, 1990), graphical 
tasks (Hegarty, Canham, & Fabrikant, 2010; Novick & Catley, 2007), and mathematical 
problems (Bassok, 2001; Landy & Goldstone, 2007). The aim of the present article is 
twofold:
1. to separate difficulties caused by the presentation format of the SF task from 
difficulties caused by the SF system itself and
2. to develop a presentation format that enables more participants to derive cor-
rect conclusions in SF systems
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In the context of simulations and games, presentation formats that deliver valid 
assessment of people’s understanding of SF systems are especially important, because 
the simulation or game should not only measure people’s understanding, but also help 
them understand. When giving trigger-based feedback, for example, a simulation 
might assess how well the learner is doing and it might use this assessment for scaf-
folding (e.g., giving suggestions on possible actions), for delivering background infor-
mation (e.g., on the state of the system), or for adaptation (e.g., of the difficulty of the 
simulation). For all of these purposes, a valid assessment of the learner’s understand-
ing of the SF system is essential: If the learner’s understanding of the SF system is 
under- or overestimated, then scaffolding cannot be in tune with the learner, back-
ground information might be too difficult or unnecessary, and the simulation might 
demand too much or too little.
Thus far, assessment of people’s understanding of SF systems has been rather pes-
simistic: In the dynamic stock and flows task, for example, participants needed to keep 
the accumulation of a simulated stock such as water or CO2 within a predefined range 
by manipulating user in- and outflow rates under the condition of varying environmen-
tal inflow and constant environmental outflow (Dutt & Gonzalez, 2007; Gonzalez & 
Dutt, 2011). It was found that, to achieve the desired stock level, participants used a 
pattern matching heuristic by simply matching the shape of the flow function (e.g., 
increasing) to the shape of the environmental inflow function, regardless of the con-
stant environmental outflow. Thus, participants disregarded the fundamental SF struc-
ture of the problem.
Stock-flow failure was not only found in simulated environments, but even in basic 
SF systems that were reduced to the essentials: one inflow, one outflow, and one stock 
(Sterman & Booth Sweeney, 2002, 2007). In these paper-based tasks, participants 
were typically first presented with an introduction to the scenario, such as atmospheric 
CO2 concentration. They were then presented with a graph depicting atmospheric CO2 
concentration stabilizing from the year 2100 onward and with a graph depicting previ-
ous CO2 emissions and absorptions. Participants were asked to sketch emission and 
absorption trajectories, so that a stabilizing CO2 concentration could be achieved. In 
similar fashion to results from simulations (Dutt & Gonzalez, 2007; Gonzalez & Dutt, 
2011), participants typically made use of a pattern matching heuristic, sketching in- 
and outflows that followed the trajectory of the stock. As a result, drawn emissions 
typically exceeded absorptions leading to an actual increase of atmospheric CO2 
(Sterman & Booth Sweeney, 2002, 2007). SF failure was also demonstrated for multi-
ple-choice answer formats, different outcome scenarios (e.g., atmospheric CO2 con-
centration decreasing), and different semantic embeddings (Booth Sweeney & 
Sterman, 2000; Cronin & Gonzalez, 2007; Sterman & Booth Sweeney, 2002, 2007). 
Thus, SF failure has so far been found both in simulations and in a wide range of sim-
plified paper-based tasks.
We argue, however, that it is necessary to distinguish different sources of difficulty 
that might arise when dealing with SF problems. Specifically, in simulations, partici-
pants might lack skills to regulate the system (Mislevy, 2011). If that is the case, par-
ticipants might know what to do, but they simply cannot do it well or fast enough (i.e., 
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they might possess declarative, but lack procedural knowledge). Moreover, previous 
paper-based tasks, despite variation, all contained one possibly critical aspect: an over-
all scientific notation including coordinate systems, graphs, and percentage values. It 
has been shown in several studies that comprehension of coordinate systems and 
graphs is error-inducing (Carpenter & Shah, 1998; Gattis & Holyoak, 1996; Shah & 
Carpenter, 1995) and that participants have difficulties dealing with percentage values 
(Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1998; Hoffrage, Lindsey, 
Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000). Consequently, people might possess a basic, declara-
tive, understanding of SF systems, but this might have been concealed in previous 
research in which additional and potentially error-inducing skills and knowledge were 
needed.
Cronin et al. (2009) specifically investigated whether SF failure is a mere artifact 
of using coordinate systems by presenting participants with alternative formats (line 
graphs, bar charts, texts, and tables; see Figure 1 for the textual display). Participants 
needed to solve the so-called department store problem, describing the number of 
people entering and leaving a department store over a period of time. To control for 
comprehension of the presentation format, participants were asked at what time most 
people entered or left the department store. Because the majority of participants were 
able to answer these control questions correctly, but still showed SF failure, the Cronin 
et al. concluded that SF failure is not an artifact of the presentation format, but rather 
a fundamental error in human reasoning.
Figure 1. Textual display of the original presentation format of SF problems.
Source. Cronin, Gonzalez, and Sterman (2009).
Note. SF = stock-flow.
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However, this conclusion might be premature for three reasons. First, the control 
questions could be answered correctly by using simple salience heuristics picking the 
highest or lowest number given. Thus, only a superficial understanding of coordinate 
systems was necessary. An arguably deeper understanding, however, is necessary to be 
able to answer the SF problems. Second, the control questions tested interpretation of 
graphs and not the construction thereof. However, construction of graphs was a pre-
requisite for solving the SF problems correctly. Third, in all data displays—even the 
textual—specific numerical information was salient. We argue that this salience of 
quantitative information encourages participants to focus on and work with the given 
numbers, rather than making an effort to detect the underlying SF structure. It is con-
ceivable that a qualitative presentation format might encourage and enable partici-
pants to detect the underlying SF structure.
The experiment presented in this article investigated whether different SF problems 
measure construct-relevant aspects of the problem (understanding of SF structure) 
versus construct-irrelevant aspects of the problem (understanding of the presentation 
format) using two different tasks: Interpretation and Production tasks and Verbal tasks.
1. Interpretation and Production tasks (I/P tasks): I/P tasks examined whether 
participants are equally able to interpret and produce graphs, and whether they 
are equally able to submit their answers verbally and graphically. These dis-
tinctions were introduced to investigate whether participants’ potential under-
standing of SF dynamics was concealed in previous research: If participants 
are able to answer SF questions correctly when submitting their answers ver-
bally, but then make errors constructing the corresponding line graph, the orig-
inal presentation format could not be seen as a valid assessment of participants’ 
understanding of SF systems.
2. Verbal tasks: Verbal tasks did not rely on coordinate systems or graphs for 
either problem description or answer format by using multiple-choice answers. 
Verbal tasks also contained little or no numerical information. Hence, verbal 
tasks tested whether SF failure could be reduced or even eliminated when an 
understanding of coordinate systems is not required, no graphical reference is 
given, and when participants are encouraged to detect the qualitative gist of the 
problem structure.
We hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Even those participants who correctly solve a given SF prob-
lem verbally may not be able to construct the corresponding line graph into a coor-
dinate system. Thus, solution rates for one and the same problem will be lower 
when a graphical answer is required (Question 4 in the I/P tasks) than when a verbal 
answer is required (Question 3 in the I/P tasks).
Hypothesis 2 (H2): SF failure will be significantly reduced in a verbal and multi-
ple-choice presentation format that comprises no coordinate systems or graphs and 
little or no quantitative information (verbal tasks).
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Method
Participants
A total of N = 107 participants (65% females) between 23 and 75 years of age took part 
in the experiment. Mean age was 48.4 years (SD = 16.9). All participants gave written 
informed consent and were debriefed on the purpose and results of the study. The 
sample consisted of students from the University of Heidelberg and people from the 
general population. Participants received course credit or 5€ for participation.
Materials
1. I/P tasks: I/P tasks were administered in two scenarios (atmospheric CO2 concen-
tration, number of children on a playground). Each scenario comprised four ques-
tions that we illustrate using the CO2 scenario (see Figure 2). Participants first 
received a short introduction to the problem describing the relationship between 
CO2 emissions, absorptions, and atmospheric CO2 concentration. Participants 
were then presented with a coordinate system depicting in- and outflows and four 
subtasks exploring fundamental understanding of the graphs (Question 1), verbal 
production of the resulting stock (Question 2), verbal production of necessary 
inflows and outflows given a decreasing stock (Question 3), and the graphical 
production of the answer to Question 3 into a coordinate system (Question 4). 
Note that Question 3 (verbal production of in- and outflows) was an easy question 
to test whether participants who are able to produce a correct verbal answer neces-
sarily produce a correct graphical answer. Questions in the playground scenario 
were identical, except that in Question 3, participants were asked to achieve a 
stabilizing stock (see Appendix A for the complete playground scenario).
2. Verbal tasks: Verbal tasks comprised a verbal description of the problem and a 
multiple-choice answer format, and were administered in three different sce-
narios (money in a piggy bank, water in a bathtub, atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tion). Participants first received a short introduction to the problem. In the 
bathtub (piggy bank) problem, participants were then asked to name the cor-
rect strategy in order to achieve a stabilizing (rising) stock, that is, to give a 
qualitative estimation of flows. In the CO2 problem, participants needed to 
determine how the stock reacts if emissions were reduced by 30%, that is, to 
give a qualitative estimation of the stock. For illustration, in the bathtub sce-
nario, participants were given the following instructions and problem (see 
Appendix B for the piggy bank and CO2 scenario):
You have a bathtub. Water runs into this bathtub through the tap. Meanwhile, water runs 
out of the bathtub through the drain because it does not seal properly. Imagine, ten minutes 
ago, you started letting water run into the bathtub and you are now satisfied with the water 
level. What do you need to do in order to keep the current water level constant?
a. Open the water tap a little further.
b. Leave the tap as it is.
c. Close the water tap a little.
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Thus, the bathtub scenario was a verbal translation of the original presentation for-
mat (Sterman & Booth Sweeney, 2002, 2007) comprising one inflow and one outflow 
and a to-be-stabilized stock.
Procedure
Each participant completed both I/P tasks (playground, CO2) and one randomly 
assigned verbal task (bathtub, piggy bank, CO2). Presentation order was randomized.
Results
In the I/P tasks, the majority of our sample (M = 97%) was able to correctly read and 
interpret the graphs (Question 1, see Figure 2). Also verbal production tasks about 
both flows (Question 2, M = 83%) and stocks (Question 3, M = 89%) were answered 
correctly by the majority of participants, producing no significant difference between 
Figure 2. Example of the I/P task: Atmospheric CO2 scenario (translated).
Note. Participants are presented with emissions and absorptions trajectories. The following subtasks test 
participants’ understanding of graphs (Question 1), verbal production of the resulting stock (Question 2), 
verbal production of necessary inflows and outflows given a decreasing stock (Question 3), and graphical 
production of the answer to Question 3 into a coordinate system (Question 4). I/P = interpretation and 
production.
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both tasks, χ2(1, N = 107) = 1.39, p = .24. However, in line with our expectations, 
translating verbal answers of flows (Question 3) into a graphical presentation (Question 
4) was only accomplished by 57% of the sample. A McNemar test yielded a significant 
difference between solution rates of the verbal and the graphical production tasks 
(Questions 3 and 4), χ2(1, N = 107) = 8.65, p = .003, indicating that for most partici-
pants, answers were easier to provide in a verbal than in a graphical format. 
Unexpectedly, while no significant differences were found in the CO2 scenario com-
pared with the playground scenario for Questions 1 to 3 (p > .05), a McNemar test 
yielded a significant difference between solution rates of the two scenarios in the 
graphical production task (Question 4), χ2(1, N = 107) = 16.80, p < .001: While 79.3% 
of the participants were able to sketch their answer in the CO2 scenario, only 35.4% 
were able to sketch their answers in the playground scenario. That is, participants were 
more correct drawing the relation “outflow must be smaller than the inflow” than 
drawing the relation “outflow must equal inflow.” We found a typical mistake in 
sketching the latter: Instead of drawing two identical lines, 22% of participants drew 
two parallel lines, resulting in different y values for in- and outflows. (Note that lines 
were only rated as parallel, and not as identical if they were at least 0.2 inch apart.) In 
summary, we found that when participants needed to submit their answers graphically, 
solution rates to the SF questions were dramatically lower than when participants sub-
mitted their answers verbally.
In line with our hypothesis, the majority of our sample was able to answer SF ques-
tions in the verbal tasks, yielding an average correct solution of M = 86%. Specifically, 
solution rates ranged from 98% and 90% (bathtub and piggy bank task, respectively) 
to 70% (CO2 task). Thus, SF failure could be reduced when a presentation format 
without coordinate systems and graphs and without a focus on quantitative informa-
tion was used.
Discussion
The present experiment tested whether SF failure can at least partly be explained by 
the presentation format. Results showed not only that participants have difficulties 
dealing with the graphical format used in previous research, but also that that SF rea-
soning improves dramatically in a verbal format.
In line with our hypothesis, I/P tasks revealed that the requirement of the standard 
task to produce graphs may have decreased solution rates. We found that solutions to 
one and the same task were reduced by up to 50% when a graphical compared with a 
verbal answer was required. Thus, submitting answers graphically results in a dra-
matic underestimation of participants’ true SF reasoning abilities.
One task with a stabilizing stock was particularly revealing: In the verbal condition, 
most participants arrived at the correct solution (inflow equaling outflow); when asked 
to draw this exact answer into a coordinate system, however, nearly one quarter of our 
participants sketched two parallel lines. This misconception in the construction of 
graphs may partially explain the typical mistake in the standard task with stabilizing 
stock (e.g., Sterman & Booth Sweeney, 2007): Our results suggest that at least some 
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participants may well have the correct verbal representation of the inflow needing to 
equal the outflow, but then submit a wrong answer by sketching the inflow paralleling 
the outflow. Thus, the original task presentation format using coordinate systems and 
graphs seems to underestimate participants’ ability to grasp SF problems because an 
error-inducing layer is added between participants’ mental representations and their 
submitted answers.
Although different cognitive mechanisms might be required for estimating flows 
from a given stock than vice versa, solution rates between both kinds of I/P tasks did 
not differ significantly. This result implies at least that the majority of people are able 
to accomplish both if the tasks are presented verbally. Possibly, this might even hint 
toward the underlying cognitive mechanisms being rather similar.
When both a focus on quantitative information and the use of coordinate systems 
and graphs were avoided in the verbal tasks, a majority of participants arrived at the 
correct solution to different SF problems. This result suggests that participants are able 
to understand the qualitative gist of SF problems when they are presented verbally.
Even the use of the pattern matching heuristic was significantly reduced in the ver-
bal CO2 task given that 70% of participants correctly answered that the stock increases, 
even if CO2 emissions are reduced. In other contexts, it was repeatedly shown that 
participants are able to overcome simple heuristics with insight and prefer to make use 
of the causal structure underlying the problem (Brehmer, 1976; Garcia-Retamero, 
Wallin, & Dieckmann, 2007; Gonzalez, 2004). Similarly, it was assumed before that 
participants might either use the pattern matching heuristic or make use of the prob-
lem’s causal structure (Cronin et al., 2009). In line with this reasoning, present results 
suggest that if SF tasks are presented in such a way that participants have problems 
understanding their causal structure, they make use of the simple pattern matching 
heuristic. If, however, tasks are presented in such a way that participants can detect 
their causal structure (verbal tasks), participants are able to arrive at more complex 
inferences.
Limitations and Future Directions
The question may be raised as to whether our SF tasks were too easy, especially 
because of the exclusive reliance on multiple-choice answer formats with only three 
answer options. It seems plausible that questions involving the selection of an option 
are easier to answer than questions requiring the construction of an answer. 
Nevertheless, average correct solution rates were clearly over 30% guessing rate, 
implying at least that most participants were able to understand the qualitative gist of 
SF problems when they were presented verbally. Participants also showed a system-
atic error in constructing line graphs (parallel lines as representing equal in- and out-
flows) that was only detected because of the easier structure of multiple-choice 
answers. Moreover, old participants performed equally well as young student samples 
that are most likely more experienced in answering multiple-choice questions. Thus, 
we argue that the reason for higher solution rates goes beyond the choice of multiple-
choice answer formats. It is up to further research to determine, however, just how far 
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solution rates will change when more and more difficult answer options are pro-
vided—present results demonstrate that at least a basic understanding is possible in 
that participants are able to distinguish between the three basic states of the SF system 
(increasing, stable, decreasing) and its flows (inflow bigger than, smaller than, or 
equal to outflow).
Furthermore, one could argue that, albeit structurally equivalent to SF tasks used 
previously, our verbal tasks gave away the problem structure to participants. However, 
even though verbal tasks differed in the extent to which the structure was made explicit 
to the participant in the answer options, solution rates were high even in the most dif-
ficult task: Whereas in the piggy bank scenario, the magnitude of the inflow was 
explicitly related to the magnitude of the outflow, in the bathtub scenario, only the 
inflow was mentioned in the answer options, and participants needed to establish the 
relation between in- and outflows on their own. In the CO2 scenario, this relation even 
needed to be established for a specific amount of inflow reduction. Consequently, 
verbal tasks did not simply give away the problem structure, but they better enable 
participants to detect it.
Therefore, whether people can or cannot detect the SF structure seems to depend on 
how the problem is presented. This result opens a window to a range of possible 
research questions on the link between perception and processing of SF problems. 
Previously, clear links have been shown between perception and higher level cognitive 
processes. For example, it was shown that global perceptual attention enhances cre-
ative thinking (Friedman, Fishbach, Förster, & Werth, 2003). Likewise, global versus 
local perceptual attention might affect solutions to SF problems as well, because a 
global focus (e.g., “overall, the inflow is bigger than the outflow”) is likely to result in 
higher solution rates than a local focus (e.g., “in Year 5, the inflow is 7Gt of CO2”). 
Thus, future research could deepen our understanding of the links between problem 
presentation, perceptual attention, and solution strategies. The present experiment 
demonstrated the existence of such a link; future research is needed, however, to dem-
onstrate the exact nature of it. Potential insights could then be used to help people 
understand and deal with more complex SF problems than the ones presented here 
(e.g., problems containing multiple in- and outflows or nonlinear trajectories).
Implications for Simulation-Based Learning and Assessment
Contrary to previous arguments (Sterman, 2008), present findings suggest that partici-
pants have an understanding of the fundamental SF structure, a finding that bears 
implications for simulation-based assessment and learning. In simulation studies, it 
was shown that people have great difficulties regulating simulated SF systems (Dutt & 
Gonzalez, 2007; Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011). Given the present findings, one possible 
explanation for this phenomenon can be excluded: It is not impossible per se for peo-
ple to understand basic SF structures. Consequently, two possible explanations remain: 
First, while the present experiment used basic SF problems, typical simulations, in 
contrast, contain a range of variables and resulting interactions, putting high demand 
on cognitive capacity and decreasing human ability to process the system structure 
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(Halford, Baker, McCredden, & Bain, 2013). Second, even participants who are able 
to detect the simulated system structure might lack necessary procedural knowledge 
on how to deal with the system (Mislevy, 2011). Consequently, it seems necessary to 
investigate to what extent people’s difficulties regulating dynamic and complex SF 
systems can be accounted for by (a) a lack of understanding of the system structure 
due to many interacting variables and (b) a lack of procedural knowledge.
It has been the subject of debate how simulations and games should be designed to 
be as effective as possible (Morgan, 2000). The present results suggest that the prob-
lem presentation could be complemented with verbal descriptions of the respective 
system. For example, a game on the climate system could help struggling learners by 
presenting additional, verbal information on how CO2 is emitted into, and absorbed 
from the atmosphere. That way, the system structure would be made more accessible 
and the learner could proceed to more advanced questions, for example on possible 
actions to regulate the climate system.
Moreover, we suggest that learners’ knowledge about the SF system should not 
only be inferred from their actions, but should additionally be assessed verbally to 
deliver an assessment of both knowledge and skill while working with a simulation.
It is interesting to speculate how the use of pictorial (not graphical) information 
might affect understanding of SF systems. For example, to visualize SF systems, one 
might see actual CO2 molecules collect in the atmosphere. In contrast to scientific 
notations such as coordinate systems and graphs, pictorial information should not be 
intrinsically difficult to understand. According to cognitive load theory, however, pro-
cessing of information generally uses up cognitive resources that cannot be used for 
processing of other information. If one piece of information can be fully compre-
hended on its own, additinal information such as a picture does not aid learning, but 
uses up cognitive resources nevertheless (Sweller & Chandler, 1994). It is possible 
that when additional pictorial information is given, the text or simulation is processed 
less intensively, and learning can even deteriorate (Rasch & Schnotz, 2009; Schnotz & 
Bannert, 1999). Consequently, additional pictorial information would need to add 
informational value that the simulation or text alone does not deliver, and it would 
need to deliver that information in a computationally efficient way (Rasch & Schnotz, 
2009).
Implications for Communication of SF Problems
Concerning the communication of SF problems such as the accumulation of debts, or the 
accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere, we suggest that display formats used in media 
reports such as reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) could 
be rendered more accessible by reducing the amount of quantitative information to a 
minimum. Thus far, these reports contain a large number of scientific graphs on atmo-
spheric CO2 (see, for example, the most recent IPCC, 2007, report). Importantly, the 
way information is presented not only affects the understanding of the problem, but 
also the quality of subsequent decision making (Covey, 2011). It was argued, for 
example, that people’s misunderstanding of SF structures inherent to climate change 
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could explain their lack of motivation to contribute to climate change mitigation 
(Sterman, 2008). Consequently, presenting SF problems such as climate change in a 
verbal format not only enhances people’s understanding of the problem, but might, as 
a result, also affect their ability to decide on a correct solution, or even whether to 
pursue a solution.
Conclusion
The present experiment demonstrated that people are better able to deal with SF sys-
tems if the problems are presented in a purely verbal format. This result suggests that 
both simulation-based learning and communication of SF problems could be rendered 
more effective by giving more weight to verbal information. On a more general level, 
these findings support the idea that people can deal with even highly complex prob-
lems if they are presented in accessible formats.
Appendix A
Playground scenario of the I/P tasks (translated).
Note. I/P = interpretation and production.
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Appendix B
Piggy Bank and CO2 Scenario of the Verbal Tasks (Translated)
Piggy bank scenario. Imagine that you have a piggy bank. Each month, you throw 
money into the piggy bank, and you also take some money out of the piggy bank. 
Imagine that you want to buy yourself a book worth 20€. You count the money inside 
your piggy bank and notice that you currently have 10€. What do you need to do to 
ensure the amount of money will increase to 20€?
a. You have to take less money out of the piggy bank than you throw into it.
b. You have to take more money out of the piggy bank than you throw into it.
c. You have to take out as much money as you throw into the piggy bank.
CO2 scenario. CO2 emissions are caused by the burning of fossil fuels and lead to an 
increase of atmospheric CO2 concentration. CO2 absorptions are caused by forests and 
oceans and decrease atmospheric CO2 concentration. CO2 emissions are currently 
twice as high as CO2 absorptions. Imagine that emissions were reduced by 30%: How 
would the atmospheric CO2 concentration react?
a. Atmospheric CO2 concentration would increase.
b. Atmospheric CO2 concentration would decrease.
c. Atmospheric CO2 concentration would remain constant.
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Abstract
Stocks and flows (SF) are building blocks of dynamic systems: Stocks change through inflows
and outflows, such as our bank balance changing with withdrawals and deposits, or atmospheric
CO2 with absorptions and emissions. However, people make systematic errors when trying to infer
the behavior of dynamic systems, termed SF failure, whose cognitive explanations are yet
unknown. We argue that SF failure appears when people focus on specific system elements (local
processing), rather than on the system structure and gestalt (global processing). Using a standard
SF task (n = 148), SF failure decreased by (a) a global as opposed to local task format; (b) indi-
vidual global as opposed to local processing styles; and (c) global as opposed to local perceptual
priming. These results converge toward local processing as an explanation for SF failure. We dis-
cuss theoretical and practical implications on the connections between the scope of attention and
understanding of dynamic systems.
Keywords: Dynamic systems; Global–local processing; Structure versus surface elements;
Stock-flow failure; Dynamic decision making
1. Introduction
Many decisions that we make in our daily lives involve keeping a dynamic system
under control. We aim at keeping our weight at a healthy stage by consuming the right
amount of calories and exercising, or our bank accounts in a positive balance while con-
trolling our expenses according to our incomes. Such stocks and flows (SF) structures
Correspondence should be sent to Helen Fischer, Department of Psychology, University of Heidelberg,
Hauptstrasse 47-51, 69117 Heidelberg, Germany. E-mail: helen.fischer@psychologie.uni-heidelberg.de
comprise a stock (i.e., an accumulation) that is influenced by decisions made to increase
(inflow) or to decrease the stock (outflow). As such, SF structures are the most basic
building blocks of dynamic systems and they also are the source of dynamic complexity
due to the over-time accumulation of flows into stocks (Cronin & Gonzalez, 2007; Ster-
man, 2000).
Research has shown that humans perform poorly in dynamic system tasks, even after
extended amounts of practice, performance incentives, unlimited time, and full informa-
tion (Diehl & Sterman, 1995; Fu & Gonzalez, 2006; Gonzalez, 2005; Martin, Gonzalez,
& Lebiere, 2004; Paich & Sterman, 1993; Sterman, 1989, 1994). Furthermore, poor per-
formance has also been shown in extremely simplified dynamic systems reduced to their
fundamental elements—one stock, one inflow, and one outflow (e.g., Cronin & Gonzalez,
2007; Gonzalez & Wong, 2012; Sterman, 2002). These results led researchers to suggest
a general difficulty in understanding dynamic systems, termed Stock-Flow failure (SF
failure; Cronin, Gonzalez, & Sterman, 2009). How can we explain SF failure, given the
ubiquity of dynamic systems in our environment?
A common mistake in judging SF systems, termed correlation heuristic, is the ten-
dency to judge the stock as behaving similarly to its flows (Booth Sweeney & Sterman,
2000; Cronin & Gonzalez, 2007; Cronin et al., 2009; Gonzalez & Wong, 2012). An
important example is used in recent studies showing the failure to understand the relation-
ship between the CO2 stock in the atmosphere and the inflow via anthropogenic CO2
emissions and the outflow via natural CO2 absorption (Dutt & Gonzalez, 2012; Guy, Ka-
shima, Walker, & O’Neill, 2013; Moxnes & Saysel, 2009; Sterman, 2008; Sterman &
Booth Sweeney, 2007). When participants were given a constant trend of CO2 absorptions
and a decreasing, but higher trend of emissions, they judged that the atmospheric CO2
concentration would also decrease. This is clearly erroneous, because as long as emis-
sions are higher than absorptions, the CO2 stock will increase. This result together with
examples from many other contexts suggests that following a correlation heuristic is a
common mistake (Booth Sweeney & Sterman, 2000; Brunstein, Gonzalez, & Kanter,
2010; Cronin et al., 2009; Gonzalez & Wong, 2012). Although it is an important finding,
the correlation heuristic remains a re-description of the typical behavior rather than a cog-
nitive explanation for it.
In the next sections, we develop and test the following hypotheses:
1. The SF failure is related to the tendency to concentrate on the details of a system
(local processing) rather than on the gestalt (global processing).
2. It is possible to procedurally prime participants to think globally versus locally,
influencing the SF failure.
3. The task format may induce local or global views of a system, influencing the SF failure.
1.1. Global–local processing and understanding of dynamic systems
We suggest that the SF failure may be due to a tendency to concentrate on the
details of a structure rather than on the gestalt; the local rather than the global process-
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ing initially investigated by Navon (1977). Navon presented participants with large (glo-
bal) letters constituted by small (local) letters and asked participants whether a target
letter matching either the global or the local letter was present on the screen. He found
a global dominance effect, showing that participants’ decisions were generally faster
when the target matched the global letters than when it matched the local letters. Anal-
ogous to Navon’s letters, dynamic systems can be seen as hierarchical: They consist of
a set of constituent elements and an underlying relational structure. Just like the global
character (e.g., H) in the Navon task cannot be inferred by looking at its local charac-
ters in isolation (e.g., Es or Ls), the behavior of a dynamic system cannot be inferred
from looking at its constituent elements in isolation. An abstraction process is, there-
fore, needed from local-level representations of elements to global-level representations
of structure to make inferences about the behavior of the system from information about
its elements.
We suggest a basic structural and cognitive correspondence between dynamic sys-
tems and hierarchical figures consisting of local elements and a global configuration
(see Fig. 1). Hierarchical figures such as the Kimchi–Palmer figures (Kimchi & Pal-
mer, 1982) consist of global configurations made up of local elements. The local ele-
ments in SF systems (i.e., levels of inflow or outflow at particular points in time) may
correspond to the local elements in hierarchical figures, while the global structure of
the SF system (i.e., the relationships of inflows and outflows over time) may corre-
spond to the global elements in hierarchical figures. Thus, the system’s behavior can
only be inferred from the interrelations between the elements and the system structure.
For example, to predict atmospheric CO2 concentration, one needs to see how CO2
emissions and absorptions relate to each other over a period of time (i.e., structure)
rather than seeing the exact levels of emissions or absorption at a specific point in
time (i.e., constituent elements).
How does the processing of hierarchical stimuli apply to understanding the behavior of
dynamic systems? People show inherent differences in their global and local processing
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Fig. 1. Comparison of the proposed structural and cognitive parallels between hierarchical figures and
dynamic systems. A tendency to focus on local elements (crosses) should be detrimental; a global focus on
gestalts (circles) should be beneficial for inferring the overall system behavior.
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styles (content-free ways of perceiving the environment; Tulving & Schacter, 1990).
Thus, although research shows that many individuals may exhibit global dominance and
a preference for global information processing (Kimchi, 1992; Navon, 1977), recent stud-
ies directly examine global–local processing styles as individual differences and suggest
that global–local processing styles are inherently a strong characteristic of human infor-
mation processing (Dale & Arnell, 2014). This research also shows that individual prefer-
ences for global or local information may influence performance in other tasks (Dale &
Arnell, 2014). We expect that people who tend to focus on elements in hierarchical fig-
ures also tend to focus on elements in dynamic systems, whereas people who tend to
focus on the global structure in hierarchical figures also tend to focus on the global struc-
ture of the system, thereby influencing the SF failure.
Furthermore, we expect that it would be possible to procedurally prime the percep-
tion of the gestalt of visual displays. Global procedural priming may enhance the acti-
vation of abstract objects in memory and induce creativity and broader thinking even in
unrelated (content-wise) tasks (Friedman, Fishbach, F€orster, & Werth, 2003). Research
has shown that using a global perceptual priming manipulation (e.g., instructions to
look at broad segments of a map) resulted in better creativity and novelty in a subse-
quent task, in contrast to local priming (e.g., instructions to look at narrow segments of
the same map; Friedman et al., 2003). Most important, the priming and test tasks did
not overlap in content, concluding that the effect of priming on the subsequent task
was due to a correspondence in process rather than in content. This result agrees with
recent findings in which structural similarity was crucial for reducing SF failure in con-
trast to surface similarity (Gonzalez & Wong, 2012). Thus, we expect that global–local
perceptual priming with an unrelated visual task should influence the SF failure. Partici-
pants who are instructed to look at specific elements of a visual display should be more
likely to focus on the system details, whereas participants who are instructed to look at
the entire gestalt of a visual display should focus on the system’s gestalt, that is, its
structure. Consequently, SF failure will occur more after local than after global percep-
tual priming.
A related hypothesis is that the task format may highlight the local or global views of
a system, influencing the SF failure. Fig. 2 displays a common task used in a number of
studies, the department store (DS) task (Cronin & Gonzalez, 2007; Cronin et al., 2009;
Sterman, 2000). Using this task, many researchers have studied whether people can infer
the behavior of the system as a whole (number of people inside a store), given inflows
and outflows in a graph (number of people entering and leaving). Questions 1 and 2 test
whether participants can read the flows correctly. Questions 3 and 4 (called “SF ques-
tions” henceforth) test whether participants can infer the behavior of the stock. Solution
rates for the SF questions are commonly below 50% (Brunstein, Gonzalez, & Kanter,
2010; Cronin et al., 2009; Gonzalez & Wong, 2012), irrespective of alternative graphical
representations (Cronin & Gonzalez, 2007; Cronin et al., 2009); irrespective of the
domain and the participants’ experience (Brunstein et al., 2010); irrespective of the pat-
terns of flows (Cronin et al., 2009; Gonzalez & Wong, 2012); and even when motivation
and learning are induced (Cronin et al., 2009). Using correlational thinking, participants
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The graph below shows the number of people entering and leaving a department store over a 30-
minute period.
Please answer the following questions.
Check the box if the answer cannot be determined from the information provided.
1. During which minute did the most people enter the store?
2. During which minute did the most people leave the store?
3. During which minute were the most people in the store?
4. During which minute were the fewest people in the store?
Minute 
Minute 
Minute 
Minute 
Can’t be determined.
Can’t be determined.
Can’t be determined.
Can’t be determined.
Entering
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Fig. 2. Department store (DS) task as used in Sterman (2000) and in some of the experiments in Cronin
et al. (2009).
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tended to judge that the stock is highest at the point of the highest inflow or the point of
the greatest difference between inflow and outflow (Cronin & Gonzalez, 2007; Cronin
et al., 2009).
We suggest, however, that the temptation to think locally and use a correlation heu-
ristic may have been induced by the question format. These questions ask about one
specific minute during which the stock was highest or lowest, instead of highlighting
the gestalt of the trends and the relation between the flows. We suggest that if ques-
tions are designed to emphasize the global gist of the trends, and to highlight the rela-
tive salience of the relations between the flows, attention should shift toward how the
parts relate to the whole (Kimchi, 1992; Macrae & Lewis, 2002), decreasing the SF
failure.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
A total of 148 participants (80 female, 67 male, 1 unknown) with a mean age of
34.9 years (SD = 12, range = 18–64) took part via the Internet. Participants were
recruited over Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online participant recruitment site. Partici-
pants were compensated after completion of the study through their MTurk account with
a flat $0.75 Participants were restricted to US IP addresses and had completed at least
high school; 33% had a 4-year college degree in a range of different fields, the largest
groups being Business (10%), Psychology (7%), and English (3%).
2.2. Materials
The main dependent variable in all hypotheses was the SF accuracy in the original DS
task.
The question format was manipulated in the DS task. The original, local DS task for-
mat (Fig. 2) was compared to a modified, global format (Fig. 3). Please note that in both
formats, calculations are unnecessary: One needs to only understand that the number of
people inside the store rises as long as the number of people entering is greater than the
number of people leaving. Thus, one can directly infer from the graph that the most peo-
ple are inside at minute 13 (see Cronin et al., 2009). Both formats used the exact same
introduction and graph. We removed the option to mark “can’t be determined” from both
formats, as in past research this is often the second most common mistake after the corre-
lation heuristic (Cronin et al., 2009). Instead, 7-point Likert scales assessed subjective
confidence in each answer: How confident are you in your answer? 0 = Not confident at
all and 7 = very confident.
To measure individual global–local processing styles, we used the Kimchi–Palmer-Figures
task (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982) that consists of triangles and squares made up of smaller
triangles and squares. For each of 16 trials, participants indicated whether a target figure
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The graph below shows the number of people entering and leaving a department store over a 30-
minute period.
Please answer the following questions.
1. How are the people entering related to the people leaving the store between time periods 1 to 
14?
More people entering than leaving
More people leaving than entering
Same amount of people entering and leaving
2. How are the people entering related to the people leaving the store between time periods 14 to
30?
More people entering than leaving
More people leaving than entering
Same amount of people entering and leaving
3. How would you best describe the accumulation of the number of people in the store between 
time periods 1 to 14?
Increasing
Decreasing
Stable
4. How would you best describe the accumulation of the number of people in the store between 
time periods 14 to 30?
Increasing
Decreasing
Stable
35 Entering Leaving
25
15
Pe
op
le
/M
in
ut
e
0
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Minute
18 20 22 24 26 28 302
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40
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Fig. 3. Department store task with questions in the global format.
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(e.g., a global triangle made of local squares) was more similar to a sample figure that
matched its global or its local form (Fig. 4). Display of the figures was counterbalanced
with respect to the global (local) match appearing on the left (right). Mean ratings were
conducted for each participant, ranging from 0 (completely local processing style) to 1
(completely global processing style).
To procedurally prime participants (global vs. local vs. control), a maps task similar
to Friedman et al. (2003) was used.1 A crucial difference is that the instruction used by
Friedman et al. was designed to manipulate attention scope, whereas the instruction in
the present study was designed to manipulate a focus on details versus on gestalt of
the display. For each of seven trials, a state map was presented on the screen (Fig. 5).
The focus of attention was varied via different instructions: The global group was
instructed to look at the respective state in its entirety and to describe the overall shape
of the whole state. The local group was instructed to attend to the respective capital
only and to describe the exact location of that specific city. The control group was
instructed to think about an item that characterizes the state and to name that item.
The control instructions were chosen to not influence pre-existing processing styles. For
all three conditions, the respective descriptions (overall shape vs. specific location vs.
item) were given while the map was still presented on the screen. Upon pressing enter,
the next map was displayed.
2.3. Procedure
Participants were told that they were going to take part in two tasks, one about visual
perception and one about decision making. They were told that the study would take
approx. 10 minutes and that it needed to be completed in one sitting. Participants first
completed one of three randomly assigned between-subjects perceptual priming
treatments with the maps task. Second, participants answered the within-subjects DS task
Fig. 4. Sample trial from the Kimchi–Palmer-Figures task. The target figure is displayed above; the bottom-
left figure represents the local match, and the bottom-right figure represents the global match.
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in the original (local) and the modified (global) formats. To control for potential order
effects, global-formatted and local-formatted DS task were presented in random order.
Third, individual global-local processing style was measured with the Kimchi–Palmer-
Figures task.
3. Results
Control analyses showed that first, solution rates in the original DS task did not dif-
fer when the global-formatted questions were answered first (M = .19, SD = .32)
compared to when the local-formatted questions were answered first (M = .18, SD = .30),
t(146) = .24, p = .81.). Second, mean perceptual processing styles did not differ between
global (M = .63, SD = .44) or local perceptual priming (M = .68, SD = .42), or the con-
trol group (M = .67, SD = .43), F(2, 146) = .21, p = .81. To increase readability, the fol-
lowing analyses test the specific hypotheses independently.
3.1. How does a global question format influence SF failure?
Table 1 shows the proportion of responses in the global and local question formats in
the control group (n = 43). The accuracy of questions 1 and 2 was not different for the
local and global question format; thus, the new global format does not offer an advantage
to interpreting the flows. As expected, however, people’s ability to infer the stock was
influenced dramatically by the question format. In the local format, only 19% and 16% of
participants were able to infer the system’s overall behavior, while in the global format,
65% and 84% of participants (SF questions 3 and 4, respectively) were able to infer the
correct system behavior.
Fig. 5. Sample map used for procedural priming. Participants attended to the map in its entirety (global per-
ceptual priming), to its respective capital (local perceptual priming), or to neither: They thought about an
item that characterizes the respective state (control group).
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Moreover, in the global question format, confidence ratings were connected to SF
accuracy, r(147) = .39, p < .001, whereas in the local question format, confidence ratings
were not, r(147) = .001, p = .49. This dissociation indicates that the global question for-
mat helped participants gain insight into the structure of the task, leading to subjective
confidence ratings that were diagnostic of actual SF accuracy.
3.2. Does global–local procedural priming influence SF failure?
Aggregated over all participants, priming did not seem to influence SF accuracies
F(2, 144) = 0.1, p = .90. For those participants who answered the original DS task first
(i.e., immediately after the priming manipulation, n = 71), priming did influence SF accu-
racy (Table 2). Specifically, after global priming (M = .27, SD = .38), participants achieved
higher SF accuracies compared to after local priming (M = .12, SD = .22),
t(40.7) = 1.7, p = .048, d = .5. There were no significant differences between the global or
local priming group and the control group, both p > .05. That is, in line with our hypothesis,
global perceptual priming significantly increased SF accuracies in the DS task compared to
local perceptual priming. Unexpectedly, however, global priming, albeit in the expected
direction, did not significantly improve SF accuracies compared to the control group.
3.3. Is global–local processing style related to SF failure?
Internal reliability of the global–local processing scale (Kimchi–Palmer-Figures task)
in the present study was high (a = .98). To test the influence of processing style irrespec-
tive of the influence of procedural priming, participants in the control group were classi-
fied as global processors (n = 20) or local processors (n = 23) based on the median of
the distribution of global–local scores (M = .66, SD = .43, median = .93). In line with
our reasoning, SF accuracies were higher for global (M = .24, SD = .36) than local pro-
cessors (M = .08, SD = .26) in the original local question format, t(40.9) = !1.67,
p = .05, Cohen’s d = .52. Interestingly, in the global question format, global processors
(M = .80, SD = .35) achieved only marginally higher solution rates than local processors,
(M = .67, SD = .42), t(41) = !1.13, p = .13, Cohen’s d = .34.
Moreover, for global processors, SF accuracies improved by a factor of only 3.3 from
the local to the global format, whereas for local processors, SF accuracies improved by a
Table 1
Percentage of correct responses in the local and global questions in the control group (n = 43)
DS Question
Question Format
McNemarOriginal (local) % Modified (global) %
Q1 95 91 n.s.
Q2 88 91 n.s.
SF Q3 19 65 40.12, p < .001
SF Q4 16 84 78.22, p < .001
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factor of 8.4 (leading to a smaller difference between global and local processors in the
global task). These results indicate that, first, global processors are able to take advantage
of their abilities in the local question format while, second, local processors benefitted
disproportionately from the global format.
3.4. Is global–local processing connected to correlational thinking?
Analogously to previous research (Cronin & Gonzalez, 2007; Cronin et al., 2009),
answers in the local format were coded as correlation heuristic use when participants
answered minute 4 or 8 in Question 3 (maximum inflow or maximum netflow) or minute
17 or 22 in Question 4 (maximum outflow or minimum netflow). Also, similar to past
studies where participants were asked to draw the stock trend (e.g., Dutt & Gonzalez,
2012), answers were coded as correlational thinking when imitating the trend of the flows
(answer “Decreasing” in Question 3 to imitate the inflow and “Stable” in Question 4 to
imitating the outflow). Thus, if participants use the correlation heuristic they would
answer erroneously in both SF Question 3 and 4. There was a significant reduction in cor-
relation heuristic use from the local to the global format for both SF Question 3, McNe-
mar = 12.04, p < .001, and SF Question 4, McNemar = 12.5, p < .001 (Table 3).
Finally, to investigate the connection between global–local processing styles and the
correlation heuristic irrespective of procedural priming, again the control group was used.
In line with our reasoning, global–local processing was negatively connected to correla-
tional thinking in the original DS task, r(42) = !.27, p = .03. In the global-formatted
task, global–local processing was not significantly, albeit also negatively, connected to
correlational thinking r(42) = !.17, p = .13.
4. Discussion
This research provides cognitive explanations for a robust and consistent error in pro-
cessing dynamic systems, the SF failure. First, we find that the question format may
induce local or global processing, and thus influence the SF failure. Second, the SF fail-
ure is related to individual local rather than global processing styles, and the more local
participants’ processing style, the more they tend to use the correlation heuristic. Third,
Table 2
Mean accuracy scores of the SF questions in the original DS task as a function of perceptual priming condi-
tion (local vs. control vs. global)
Priming Condition t-tests
Local
(n = 24)
M(SD)
Control
(n = 21)
M(SD)
Global
(n = 26)
M(SD) Local–global Local–control Global–control
.12 (.22) .17 (.32) .27 (.38) t(40.7) = 1.7, p = .048, d = .53 t(43) = !.50, p = .31 t(45) = .97, p = .17
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by procedurally priming participants to process information globally rather than locally,
they are able to decrease the SF failure.
SF failure in the local question format of the DS task was dramatically higher than in
the global question format. In the local question format, only a minority of participants
was able to infer the stock’s behavior. These proportions are much in agreement,
although lower than in past research (Cronin et al., 2009; Sterman, 2008). Most of the
past research in the DS task was conducted in universities with a high level of mathemat-
ics education; the lower proportions may be due to the more general population used in
the current study. When interrelations between system elements were highlighted in the
global format (Fig. 3), instead of specifics of system elements in the original format
(Fig. 2), a large proportion of participants were able to correctly infer the overall system
behavior. This result suggests that the previously found SF failure may at least in part be
attributed to the way questions about the system were asked, or specifically how the local
question format can direct participants’ attention to isolated system elements rather than
the system structure.
An alternative explanation for the better understanding of the SF system in the
modified format is that the global questions provided more or more relevant information
than the local questions by referring to “time periods 1 to 14 (14 to 30)” or by referring
to the relation between the flows. However, first, previous research found that the order
of the questions about the flows (Q1 & Q2) versus the stock (Q3 & Q4) does not have an
effect on SF accuracy (Cronin et al., 2009), and moreover, this additional information
exerted no effect on the questions regarding the flows, only on the questions regarding
the stock. Therefore, it is more likely that the difference in accuracy is due to a funda-
mental need for global structural information in inferring the behavior of the system as a
whole. This conclusion is supported by the results regarding the global–local processing
styles and global–local perceptual priming.
Table 3
Most common answers of the control group (n = 43) to the SF questions 3 and 4 in the local versus global
DS task
Answer SF Question 3 (%) SF Question 4 (%)
Local format
Max entering t = 4 12 0
Max leaving t = 21 5 9
Max net inflow t = 8 47 2
Max net outflow t = 17 7 44
Most in store t = 13 19 7
Fewest in store t = 30 0 16
Global format
Decreasing 16 84
Increasing 65 2
Stable 18 14
Note. Bold values specify the correct answers; italic values specify correlation heuristic use.
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Global processors had higher SF accuracies in the original DS task, compared to local
processors. That is, the individual’s processing style was directly related to the SF failure.
For the global question format, the global processors were only slightly better than the
local processors, and local processors benefitted disproportionately from the global ques-
tion format. These results suggest that first, as expected, global processing styles are ben-
eficial for inferring the overall behavior of the dynamic system. Second, global
processing styles are less beneficial for the understanding of transparent systems with a
salient system structure; they are especially beneficial for the understanding of intranspar-
ent systems that do not easily reveal their structure.
Similarly, in the original format highlighting isolated system elements, participants not
only used the correlation heuristic more than in the global format highlighting the system
structure—they also tended to use the correlation heuristic more, the more local (or less
global) their processing style. That is, the more people see the elements of dynamic sys-
tems as structurally related, the less they tend to believe that the output of the system
should simply be linearly correlated with its isolated input (such as erroneously believing
that the moment of biggest stock should coincide with the moment of biggest inflow). In
the global format highlighting the system structure, however, no significant relationship
between individual processing styles and correlation heuristic use existed, implying,
again, that participants hardly profit from global processing styles in the case of structur-
ally transparent systems.
It is important to note that correlational thinking may be a product of our mind to cre-
ate an economic solution to dynamic systems. Correlational thinking can be a successful
strategy in simple, linear systems (such as water boiling faster when we turn up the heat;
assuming all else is constant); this kind of thinking fails, however, in more complex,
dynamic systems (such as expecting that cutting the deficit would directly cut the debt;
Sterman, 2008). Thus, in most dynamic contexts, the only simple and correct solution
would be to focus on the system’s gestalt: its SF structure.
Perceptually priming participants to look at the gestalt of a visual display (global prim-
ing) increased their ability to infer the system’s behavior in an unrelated SF task com-
pared to priming participants to look at the details of the same display (local priming).
Since the perceptual priming and the subsequent SF task did not overlap in content, we
conclude that processes were primed: a global processing of gestalts versus local process-
ing of elements. However, our results also show that such an effect of procedural priming
may be short-lived and present only in the task immediately following the perceptual
priming task. That is, at least with our procedural priming task, no longer lasting effects
on participants’ understanding of dynamic systems may be achieved.
The present results bear theoretical implications for the connections between people’s
scope of attention and their understanding of dynamic systems. It was argued before that
broadening or narrowing the scope of attention to external perceptual input is achieved
by the same mechanism as broadening or narrowing the scope of attention to internal
conceptual representations (Friedman et al., 2003). We showed that directing attention
toward gestalts or elements of visual displays can affect whether people’s thinking is
subsequently directed toward gestalts or elements of systems. That is, we provide first
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evidence that the link between attention to external and internal stimuli may not only
exist for the mere scope of attention (i.e., whether we focus narrowly or broadly) but also
the level of attention in hierarchical constructs (i.e., whether we focus on gestalts or ele-
ments).
In sum, these findings are in line with our basic assumption of a correspondence
between the way people process hierarchical figures and the way they process dynamic
systems: Global processing enables one to perceive a system’s elements as structurally
related and to infer the overall behavior of the system from the behavior of its parts. Peo-
ple who tend to process information locally by focusing on specific details fail to under-
stand the system’s behavior, whereas people who tend to process information globally by
looking at overarching structures tend to understand the system’s behavior.
In order to enhance people’s ability to deal with dynamic systems, these results offer a
range of solutions. One could enable people to adopt higher order perspectives by teach-
ing strategies of abstraction and pattern recognition. Given our result that perceptual
priming with a purely visual task affects people’s ability to infer the behavior of a
dynamic system, it also seems necessary to ensure that the tasks performed immediately
before (or even during) interacting with a dynamic system do not induce a focus on
details and elements, but on patterns and structure—even if those tasks are completely
unrelated content-wise. Furthermore, we found that highlighting the relations between a
system’s elements verbally improves people’s understanding of the system. It might also
prove helpful to highlight relations between the elements visually by grouping the constit-
uent elements of dynamic systems in a way that implies global structure. This way, one
could induce attention on the structure of the system instead of its elements. In other
words, one could induce looking at what is signified instead of on the signs.
It remains an important open question, in how far the connections between a global–
local focus in hierarchical figures and dynamic systems still hold in dynamic, interactive
environments since hierarchical figures do not convey information about iterative pro-
cesses. Although we do expect a global focus on relations between elements to still be
beneficial for inferring the system behavior, this is for future research to decide.
Albeit SF accuracy for global processors (M = .24) was three times as high as for
local processors (M = .08) in the local DS task, solution rates were still quite low in
absolute numbers. It might, therefore, prove fruitful to investigate how even many people
with a tendency to process information globally can be led astray when the task format
highlights isolated system elements. Using eye tracking, for example, one might reveal
how participants’ perceptual focus changes as a function of task format and time on task
in such a way that pre-existing processing styles change while interacting with a global-
versus local-formatted system. By combining such an approach with different and other
tasks than the ones we used, one could also investigate how some people might even be
able to adapt their processing styles to align with specific task requirements. Assessing
reaction times might also be a valuable approach to test for alternative heuristics. For
example, in the global-formatted DS task, although correlation heuristic use was
significantly reduced, some people might still use an alternative, heuristic approach by
associating the respective line on top with an answer option due to semantic similarity,
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such as “entering” with “increasing” and “leaving” with “decreasing.” Our understanding
of the cognitive strategies used could thus be increased further by reaction times because
a bimodal response time distribution is expected if there is a subset of participants using
a heuristic approach to solve even global-formatted systems.
We introduced global–local processing as a fundamental cognitive explanation of how
people deal with dynamic complexity and why so many fail with even its most simplistic
form: SF systems containing one inflow, one outflow, and one stock. Our results converge
on the conclusion that less successful participants approach SF problems in a local man-
ner by focusing on the system elements, whereas successful participants approach them
in a global manner by focusing on the system structure, its emerging gestalt. As stated at
the beginning, SF systems themselves can be seen as building blocks: as the elements of
more complex systems constituted by several SF subsystems. It seems reasonable to spec-
ulate that a global perspective should be even more beneficial for the understanding of
more complex systems than for the basic system we used. Systems containing many inter-
acting subsystems can hardly be regulated using analytical strategies both because of lim-
ited cognitive capacities and because real-life information is mostly fuzzy. Global
processing may enable us to imagine surrounding systems in their most economic form
and to recognize basic structural regularities in a dynamic world.
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Note
1. We performed a pilot study to assess the efficacy of the procedural priming task
with online participants (n = 204). The exact same perceptual priming via the maps
task was used; to assess understanding of the dynamic system, we used a task that
was structurally equivalent to the local DS task with a different context (subscribers
and unsubscribers of a magazine). We found that SF reasoning marginally
improved after global (M = .09, SD = .25) compared to local priming (M = .04,
SD = .15), t = 1.4. p = .08.
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 Predicting the development of dynamic processes is vital in many areas of life. 
Previous findings are inconclusive as to whether higher working memory capacity (WMC) is 
always associated with using more accurate prediction strategies, or whether higher WMC 
can also lead to using overly complex prediction strategies that do not improve accuracy. In 
this study, participants predicted a range of systematically varied non-linear processes based 
on exponential functions where prediction accuracy could, or could not be enhanced using 
well-calibrated rules. Results indicate that higher WMC participants seem to rely more on 
well-calibrated rule-based strategies, leading to more accurate predictions for processes with 
highly non-linear trajectories in the prediction region. Predictions of lower WMC participants, 
in contrast, point towards an increased use of simple exemplar-based predictions strategies, 
which perform just as well as more complex strategies when the prediction region is 
approximately linear. These results imply that with respect to predicting dynamic processes, 
working memory capacity limits are!not generally a strength or a weakness, but that this 
depends on the process to be predicted. 
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 Making predictions about the development of dynamic processes is important in many 
areas of life, be it judging when the food will be done while cooking, monitoring a patient in 
critical care, or controlling an industrial power plant. However, research as early as Wagenaar 
and Sagaria (1975) has shown that the accuracy of predictions varies widely, particularly 
when processes do not follow a simple linear pattern. In this article, we focus on the 
contribution of working memory capacity (WMC) for explaining this variation in predictions, 
particularly considering the interaction of WMC and the type of process to be predicted. 
Intuitively, higher memory capacity should always improve prediction accuracy since people 
need to consider information about the past of a process in order to forecast its future (cf. 
Mackinnon & Wearing, 1991). And indeed, research has shown that higher WMC is related to 
higher prediction accuracy for continuous processes (function-learning) and categorization 
tasks (Bröder et al., 2010; Lewandowsky et al., 2012; McDaniel, Cahill, Robbins, & Wiener, 
2014). One common explanation for this observation is that higher WMC is associated with 
an improved ability to actively maintain and manipulate past information, which is needed to 
calibrate cognitive prediction algorithms to the learning data, and to abstract systematic 
regularities. These regularities, or “rules” can then be used for prediction (McDaniel et al., 
2014). In this line of reasoning, WM capacity limits are a weakness that lead to less accurate 
predictions. 
 However, numerous findings following the “ecological rationality” approach (e.g., 
Marewski, Gaissmaier & Gigerenzer, 2010) show that in a surprising number of situations 
simple, information-frugal heuristics – which rely on minimal information and are not 
working memory intensive – perform just as well as complex rules (Marewski & Schooler, 
2011). Similar arguments have been made for the limited capacity of working memory itself  
(Cowan, 2010), arguing that rather than being a compromise between processing capacity and 
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metabolic efficiency, a limited WMC may confer genuine advantages. One reason is that 
because higher WMC endows one with the ability to execute mental algorithms on-line, 
higher WMC participants are more likely to employ complex strategies, even when simpler 
solutions are available (for a review, Wiley & Jarosz, 2012). In this line of reasoning, capacity 
limits are a strength that may lead to more elegant solution strategies. What may unite the 
conflicting views on the necessity of higher WMC for predictions is that higher WMC may be 
beneficial for predicting processes that require the abstraction of complex rules, but not for 
processes that fit simple, information-frugal prediction strategies. 
 To investigate this question, we used a learning paradigm with different types of 
exponential processes, where participants where first trained with the beginning of a process 
and then predicted how the process would continue. Information about the process and 
participants’ predictions was given in numerical form trial-by-trial. No descriptive summary 
information, for example in the form of graphs, was available, so that participants needed to 
rely on WM to make predictions. We used variations of exponential processes for three 
reasons. First, they are practically relevant, as many processes in real life show exponential 
dynamics: The spreading of diseases, tipping points in ecological systems, and population 
growth can all have dramatic consequences if not anticipated early on. Second, empirical 
research has shown that people find them difficult to predict in general (Wagenaar & Sagaria, 
1975), but little is known about the effects of individual differences on prediction accuracy. 
Third, choosing a positive vs. negative exponent allows to manipulate whether the process is 
asymptotic (increasingly linear), or accelerating (increasingly non-linear) that is, whether the 
simplest possible prediction strategy (linearity) performs optimal—or not.  
 Prediction strategies can be summarized in two broad classes: rule-based and 
exemplar-based. Rule-based models assume that participants abstract a global rule (e.g., 
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exponential versus quadratic) describing the ensemble of information on the to-be predicted 
process (McDaniel & Busemeyer, 2005). To do so, participants use the feedback provided to 
update the parameters of their rule in order to calibrate their prediction algorithms to the 
training data (Koh & Meyer, 1991). Exemplar-based models, in contrast, assume that 
participants store single exemplars of cue-criterion mappings in memory (Nosofsky, 1988), 
and that only the most similar training exemplars are retrieved for extrapolation. The 
extrapolation association model (EXAM; DeLosh et al.,1997) and the population of linear 
experts (POLE; Kalish, Lewandowsky & Kruschke, 2004) assume that participants learn 
associations between x- and y-values (EXAM), or between x-values and a matching linear 
function, an expert (POLE). Participants extrapolate linearly through the two most similar x-
and associated y-values (EXAM), or using the most similar x-value and its expert (POLE). 
Rule-and exemplar based strategies differ with respect to how much training information they 
use, and how well they use it. Rule-based strategies are more information-intensive in that a 
substantial amount of training information is used to induce and calibrate the rule (even if the 
resulting rule itself is comparatively simple and represents an economic form of information 
representation). Exemplar-based strategies, in contrast, are information-frugal in that only the 
most similar training exemplars are used for making a prediction. And only rule-based, but 
not exemplar-based, strategies imply that participants calibrate their prediction algorithms to 
the training data. 
 If exemplar-based strategies use less training information and are less calibrated: How 
can they ever make as accurate predictions as complex rules? In asymptotic processes, even if 
one abstracted the correct function rule, this would not pay off in terms of prediction accuracy 
because complex rule-based predictions and simple linear predictions based on the exemplars 
most similar to extrapolation overlap in these cases (Fig. 1). Moreover, rule-induction tends to 
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be error-prone because several problem steps need to be performed on-line and in WM 
(Beilock & DeCaro, 2007), whereas the linear predictions required for EXAM or POLE are 
typically performed with near optimal accuracy (Busemeyer, Byun, Delosh & McDaniel, 
1997). Abstracting information-intensive rules hence cannot outperform simple linear 
strategies for predicting the later parts of asymptotic processes, but may even impair 
predictions. In increasingly non-linear processes such as the accelerating functions shown in 
Figure 1, in contrast, rule-based strategies that capture the process’ trend should clearly be 
more accurate because simple linear predictions would lead to a dramatic underestimation of 
the trajectory.  
 
Figure 1. Design of the experiment and the accelerating increasing (A), accelerating 
decreasing (B), asymptotic decreasing (C) and asymptotic increasing (D) processes. 
Participants learned about the processes from time points 0 to 85 (training), and predicted the 
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processes from time points 90 to 115. Participants predicted exponential processes (black), 
and their respective quadratic twins (grey) that run through the same two training exemplars 
closest to extrapolation.  
 
 It seems plausible that higher WMC should lead to more accurate predictions in 
processes that benefit from the induction of information-intensive rules, that is, accelerating 
processes in the present experiment. This is because rule-induction requires one to memorize 
cue and criterion values, estimate their differences, and update the rule accordingly. These 
processes arguably encompass storage and transformation of information—key facets of 
working memory (Oberauer, Süß, Schulze, Wilhelm & Wittmann, 2000). In categorization 
and multiple-cue judgments tasks, WMC indeed predicted performance in tasks requiring 
rule-based strategies (Hoffmann, von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2014), and the involvement of 
WMC is particularly high when more cues need to be considered, or more complex rules need 
to be abstracted (Juslin, Karlsson & Olson, 2008; Mata et al., 2012). WMC is also associated 
to rule accuracy in a prototypical rule-induction task—Raven’s Progressive Matrices—, 
particularly for items requiring complex rules (Little, Lewandowsky & Craig, 2014; Wiley et 
al., 2011). Despite these compelling connections, there is only one study directly assessing 
how WMC affects continuous predictions. McDaniel, Cahill, Robbins and Wiener (2014) 
suspected that greater WMC allows participants to actively maintain a range of cue-criterion 
values, and to concurrently compare them over trials to abstract a functional rule. Higher 
WMC participants were indeed more likely to use rule- as opposed to exemplar-based 
strategies, and achieved higher prediction accuracy. In this study, however, only one type of 
process was used (V-shaped) that was particularly chosen to demand rule-based strategies.  
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 In cases where simple linear prediction models perform optimal—asymptotic 
processes in the present case—, higher WMC might not pay off in terms of better predictions. 
Exemplar-based predictions rely on verbatim recall of only the most similar training 
exemplars, and therefore require hardly any WM resources. Hoffmann, von Helversen and 
Rieskamp (2014), for example, found that WMC is not related to performance in exemplar-
based judgment tasks at all. It is unclear, however, whether higher WMC participants will use  
simple exemplar-based strategy in the first place, or whether they will try to apply rules even 
if this strategy doe not pay off. Some studies found higher cognitive capacity to foster 
adaptive strategy-use (Bröder, 2003; Lewandowsky, Yang Newel & Kalish, 2012), so that one 
possibility is that in the case of asymptotic processes, higher WMC participants would 
perform just as if they had lower WMC, and use the simpler exemplar-based strategies. Other 
studies, however, found higher WMC to be detrimental for performance in tasks where simple 
strategies perform optimal. In Luchins’ classic water jug problem, a complex solution strategy 
is needed for the first trials, but a simpler strategy becomes available later on. Because WMC 
is related to one’s ability to focus attention, higher WMC participants were less likely to 
switch to the simple strategy and instead persisted in using the overly complex strategy 
(Beilock & DeCaro, 2007). Similarly, in a judgment task for which a simple similarity-based 
strategy performed optimal, participants were more likely to use the optimal strategy when 
less WM resources were available under cognitive load (Hoffmann, von Helversen & 
Rieskamp, 2013). In the present study, we therefore expect that higher WMC should pay off 
when predicting complex, accelerating processes, but higher WMC may not pay off when 
predicting simple, asymptotic processes.  
 In line with the findings reported above, we assume that higher WMC fosters the use 
of well-calibrated rules, which integrate substantial amounts of training information for 
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prediction as opposed to the use of simple exemplar-based extrapolation strategies involving 
little training information. We designed a prediction experiment based on the exponential 
functions shown in Fig. 1 to test this assumption and several hypotheses derived from it. 
 First, we expect participants with higher WMC to show better accuracy during the 
training phase, as they are more able to induce a rule adequately describing the training 
information, that is, a rule that is better calibrated to the training data. 
 Second, if higher WMC participants rely more on rules, their accuracy in training and 
extrapolation phases should correlate more strongly.  The more the induced rules correct, the 
more this should benefit later predictions, the more the rules are incorrect, this should harm 
later predictions.  
 Third, we expect lower WMCs participants to rely more on only the most recent 
information available for extrapolation, while rule-based predictions associated with higher 
WMC should integrate more training information. To test this hypothesis we constructed a 
quadratic “twin” process for each exponential stimulus. For each point in the training phase, 
exponential processes and their quadratic twins had a different value except for the two points 
just before the extrapolation region, which were identical. Hence, the more participants rely 
only on the most recent exemplars for extrapolation, the more similar their extrapolation for 
both twins should be. Rule-based extrapolation, which by definition integrates more training 
information, should increase the difference in predictions between twins. In contrast to 
previous research, which equated rule-use with higher accuracy (McDaniel et al., 2014), this 
design allows to investigate whether prediction strategy and prediction accuracy are 
differentially affected by WMC. 
 Fourth and finally, differences in relying on rule-based versus exemplar-based 
predictions should result in an interaction of WMC and stimulus type with respect to 
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extrapolation accuracy. We expect that the increased use of rule-based prediction improves 
prediction accuracy for the increasingly non-linear part of accelerating functions. However, as 
complex rules have no benefit for predicting the increasingly linear part of asymptotic 
processes, we expect no difference between higher and lower WMC in these conditions 
Method 
 Design. Each participant predicted four processes, two exponential and their 
respective quadratic twins. Acceleration of the exponential processes (accelerating or 
asymptotic) was varied between-subjects, direction (increasing or decreasing) within-subjects. 
To reduce carryover effects, WMC tests were interleaved between prediction tasks. 
Participants. In total, 290 students from Heidelberg University participated (201 
female, mean age = 23.0, SD=2.7). All participants gave written informed consent, and were 
rewarded with 5 Euro. 
Materials. Four exponential and quadratic function pairs were constructed such that 
the twinned functions were identical at the two points closest to extrapolation (time points 80 
and 85) but different at all other points (see Fig.1 and Table 1). Functions were constructed 
for a time range (x-value) from 0 to 115 increasing in steps of 5, i.e., 24 time steps.  
Table 1. Stimulus functions. 
Acceleration Direction Exponential function Quadratic twin function 
accelerating increasing 3000+e(0.045*x+4.2) 0.6494*(x + 12.355)2 - 99.13) 
accelerating decreasing 2000+e(-0.045*x+8) 0.2445*(x - 89.042)2 + 2061 
asymptotic increasing 1500 - e(-0.045*x+7) -0.0108*(x - 137.6351)2 + 1506.15 
asymptotic decreasing 1500 - e(0.045*x+2)) -0.0491*(x + 57.979)2 + 2165.11 
 
 Working memory tests. WMC was assessed using digit span forward (DSF), digit 
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span backward (DSB) and letter-number-sequences (LNS).  We selected these WM measures 
as they are easy to administer and structural equation modeling shows that they load on the 
same working memory construct assessed by more complex measures such as operating span, 
LNS somewhat more so than Digit Span (Shelton et al., 2009). In both span tasks, 
increasingly longer series of digits were presented which participants repeated in forward 
(DSF) or reverse (DSB) order using an on-screen keyboard. In the LNS task, increasingly 
longer series of alternating digits and numbers were presented, and participants repeated the 
numbers in ascending and the letters in alphabetical order. Span lengths ranged from four to a 
maximum of nine trials for DSF/LNS, and eight for DSB. Each subtest was finished after 
failing two (LNS: three) consecutive trials of a given span length. Individual WMC scores are 
the mean of the z-standardized scores (consisting of the sum of correct trials) for all subtests. 
 Procedure. Participants were instructed that they were to predict four different 
processes over time. The nature of the processes was left unspecified. Each process contained 
24 trials, 18 learning and 6 extrapolation trials. During each trial, participants were shown the 
current time point (labeled “time”) approximately in the middle of the computer screen and 
entered their prediction for that time point as a number into a textbox (labeled “value”) 
directly below. Time points then increased in steps of five from 0 to 115, and for each time 
point, participants made one prediction. During time 0 to 25 and 55 to 85, participants then 
received feedback showing the correct value of the process at that time, displayed below the 
time point and their prediction. During time 30 to 55 and 90 to 115, no feedback was given. 
The first block of trials without feedback served to enhance the learning process trough an 
intermediate testing phase (cf. Kang et al., 2011), the second block constitutes the main 
extrapolation region (Fig.1). If not noted otherwise, “predictions” refers to the extrapolation 
phase in the remainder of this text. As previous studies did not control for potential effects of 
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explicitly instructing participants to search for a rule, half of the participants was instructed to 
use the feedback provided to find a rule describing the processes, while the other half was 
instructed to simply observe the feedback provided and use their intuition to make predictions. 
 
Results  
 Outliers. If more than half of the predictions for a single function had z-standardized 
values > 5 relative to the whole sample, data from the corresponding participants were 
excluded from the analyses for this function. This resulted in 4% of all data points excluded. 
The experiment had at 80% power at α < .05 to detect effects of d = 0.35 in between-subjects 
comparisons and dz = 0.26 for within-subjects comparisons (calculation based on cells with 
lowest counts). 
Dependent variables. As indices of accuracy, we used the Mean Absolute Error 
(MAE) and the Mean Relative Error (MRE), where MRE is the MAE standardized by the 
correct function value at any given point. For comparisons within function twins we use MAE, 
otherwise MRE to correct for different scaling. To assess how much participants differentiate 
in predictions between two process twins as a measure of strategy-use, we simply calculated 
the mean difference of predictions. The sample was split into higher and lower WMC 
participants based on the median. 
  Effects of instruction. Supporting the use of unspecified instructions in previous 
studies, the dedicated rule-search versus intuitive instructions did not exert an effect on 
accuracy nor on differentiation, neither for accelerating nor for asymptotic processes, all p’s 
>.1. We therefore excluded this factor from further analyses.  
 Effects of acceleration and direction. We compared relative prediction errors (MRE) 
as a function of acceleration (accelerating vs. asymptoting) and direction (increasing vs. 
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decreasing) of the exponential processes to assess their difficulties. We found a main affect of 
both acceleration F(1, 222) = 643,  p <.001 and direction F(1, 221) = 269, p <.001, and a 
significant interaction F(1, 221) = 263, p <.001 such that while prediction errors were 
generally higher for accelerating (M=.44 SD=.011) compared to asymptotic functions 
(M=.013 SD=.013), and generally higher for decreasing (M=.35 SD=.015) compared to 
increasing processes (M=.10 SD=.005), prediction errors increased especially for the 
accelerating decreasing process (M=.68 SD=.02). The quadratic functions were in between 
accelerating and asymptotic functions, with a smaller error than their accelerating twins, 
t(154)=-21, p <  .001, but a larger error than their asymptotic twins t(113)=8.4, p<.001. In 
sum, the processes had the following difficulties: increasing < decreasing and asymptotic < 
quadratic < accelerating. 
 WMC and training accuracy. Testing whether participants calibrate their prediction 
strategies to the training data as a prototypical sign of rule-induction, we found that higher 
compared to lower WMC participants’ strategies were better calibrated (lower MAEs) in all 
processes, that is, the accelerating increasing (M=210, SD=118 vs. M=283, SD=170), t(137.3) 
= 3.0, p=.002, accelerating decreasing (M=25, SD=9 vs. M=29, SD=12), t(123) = 2.0, p=.003, 
asymptotic increasing (M=82, SD=63 vs. M=122, SD=82), t(76.8) = 2.7, p=.004, and 
asymptotic decreasing (M=165, SD=136 vs. M=207, SD=144), t(107) = 1.6, p=.06.  
 We then tested to what extent participants use their—more or less—calibrated 
strategies for predictions. In the accelerating processes, calibration and prediction errors 
(MAE) were correlated for both lower, r(66)=.39, p=.001, and higher WMC participants, 
r(71)=.29, p=.007 (no sig. difference, z = .56, p>.1). Interestingly, however, this pattern did 
not hold for the asymptotic processes. Calibration and prediction errors were unrelated for 
lower WMC participants, r(55)= -.09, p=.24, but significantly related for higher WMC 
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participants, r(60)=.35, p=.003 (sig. difference, z = 2.39, p=.017). Very much in line with 
these results, variances of prediction errors (MAE) of higher and lower WMC participants 
were identical for both accelerating process, both p >.1, but variances were bigger for higher 
compared to lower WMC participants for both the asymptotic increasing (SD=22 vs. SD=17), 
F(1, 98) =9.4, p =.003, and decreasing process (SD=33 vs. SD=24), F(1, 100) = 2.3, p =.04.  
 WMC and information-use. Concerning how much participants differentiated in 
their predictions between process twins, there were no differences between higher compared 
to lower WMC participants in the asymptotic processes, both increasing (M=2, SD=43 vs. 
M=-5, SD=51), t(97) =.788, p=.43, and decreasing (M=38, SD=110 vs. M=43, SD=152), 
t(77.7) =.16, p=.87, suggesting that both groups used more or less identical predictions in 
these cases. Higher compared to lower WMC participants’ differentiations were significantly 
different, however, in the accelerating processes, both increasing, t(118) =-1.7, p=.054, and—
more strongly so—decreasing, t(76.8) = 3.2, p=.001. The descriptive differentiations 
(calculated exponential function value – quadratic function value) also show that only for 
high, but not for lower WMC participants, differentiations were in line with the correct 
trajectories of exponential versus quadratic processes, namely positive for the accelerating 
increasing (M=197, SD=1089 vs. M=-156, SD=1309), and negative for the accelerating 
decreasing process (M=-43, SD=149 vs. M=48, SD=145). 
 In sum, higher WMC calibrated their prediction strategies more to training data and 
used their calibrated strategies consistently for prediction in all process types. Lower WMC 
participants, in contrast, used (albeit less-)calibrated strategies when predicting accelerating 
processes, but did not use calibrated strategies at all when predicting asymptotic processes. 
   WMC and prediction accuracy. To investigate a potentially differential influence 
of WMC and process type on prediction accuracy in an ANOVA, we z-standardized errors 
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(MAE) to calculate interaction effects. In line with our expectation, we found a significant 
interaction between process type (accelerating vs. asymptoting) and WMC (higher vs. lower), 
F(1, 222) = 5, p =.027, but no significant interaction between WMC and direction of the 
process (increasing vs. decreasing), F(1, 219) = 0.3, p =.60, suggesting that the differential 
influence of WMC on prediction accuracy holds for both increasing and decreasing processes. 
Specifically, in the accelerating processes, higher compared to lower WMC participants made 
better predictions (lower MAEs) for both increasing (M=2109, SD=906 vs. M=2419, 
SD=1137), t(147) = 1.8, p=.03, and decreasing processes (M=211, SD=106 vs. M=270, 
SD=113), t(143) = 3.3, p=.001. Higher compared to lower WMC participants predicted higher 
values for the accelerating increasing (M=8197, SD=1041 vs. M=7918, SD=1337), t(147) = 
1.4, p=.007, and lower values for the accelerating decreasing process (M=880, SD=145 vs. 
M=933, SD=126), t(143) = 2.4, p=.001, showing that higher WMC participants’ mean 
predictions followed more the correct trajectories of  the accelerating processes.  
 As implied by the significant interaction between WMC and process type, this pattern 
of results did not hold for the asymptotic processes. Despite differing prediction strategies, 
higher and lower WMC participants’ predictions were virtually identical for both the 
asymptotic increasing (M=1506, SD=22 vs. M=1500, SD=17), t(102) = -1.4, p=.16, and 
decreasing process (M=2007, SD=50 vs. M=2011, SD=31) t(99) =.46, p=.64. Furthermore, 
higher WMC participants’ predictions were not more accurate compared to lower WMC 
participants in both the asymptotic increasing (M=20, SD=21 vs. M=17, SD=14), t(95.3) = -
1,1, p=.29, and decreasing process (M=33, SD=43 vs. M=24, SD=27), t(72.4) = -1.4, p=.16, 
but were, as descriptive values show, even less accurate by tendency.  
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Discussion 
 This study investigated how working memory capacity limits are associated to 
prediction strategy-use and prediction accuracy. To measure strategy-use, we employed three 
operationalizations. We found that, first, higher WMC participants’ prediction strategies were 
better calibrated to the training data for every single process, suggesting that higher WMC 
participants were better able to align their prediction strategies to the structure of the training 
data. Second, higher WMC participants’ calibration and prediction accuracy were correlated 
in every single process, whereas for lower WMC participants, calibration and accuracy were 
completely uncorrelated in the asymptotic processes, suggesting that only higher WMC 
always used calibrated strategies for predictions. And third, only higher, but not lower, WMC 
participants differentiated between accelerating function twins in the direction of the correct 
process trajectory: They predicted higher absolute values for the accelerating increasing 
process compared to its quadratic twin, and lower absolute values for the accelerating 
decreasing process compared to its twin, suggesting that their prediction strategies 
differentiated between exponential and quadratic process twins in line with the correct process 
trajectories in these cases. In sum, both training and prediction results support the central 
hypotheses that higher WMC facilitates the use of better-calibrated rule-based prediction 
strategies. 
 It may seem intuitive that the ability to calibrate prediction strategies better to match 
the training information should always be beneficial. However, we found an interaction 
between WMC and the type of the to-be predicted process. Higher WMC participants were 
more accurate predicting the accelerating processes, but not more accurate predicting the 
asymptotic processes. Instead, higher and lower WMC participants predicted virtually 
identically values in both the asymptotic increasing and decreasing processes—despite higher 
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WMC participants' clearly better calibrated strategies. Higher WMC hence was more 
beneficial for making accurate predictions only in processes that benefit from information-
intensive well-calibrated rules, but was not beneficial for making predictions of processes that 
can be predicted using information-frugal, exemplar-based strategies. However, higher WMC 
participants generally used well-calibrated rule-based strategies more often, both when 
predicting accelerating processes (where this is the optimal strategy) and when predicting 
asymptotic processes (where a simpler and equally accurate strategy is available). 
 One dissociation between higher and lower WMC participants seems particularly 
noteworthy. For higher WMC participants, training errors were always predictive of 
prediction errors, suggesting that the degree to which their prediction algorithms were 
calibrated to the training data determined their prediction accuracy: Those inducing well-
calibrated rules tended to make better predictions than those inducing poorly calibrated rules. 
For lower WMC participants, these results were mirrored in case of the accelerating processes, 
only on a lower level: lower compared to higher WMC participants' prediction strategies were 
less calibrated to the training data, and consequently produced less accurate predictions. In 
case of the asymptotic processes, however, the difference between higher and lower WMC 
seemed to be qualitative in nature, since lower WMC participants' training errors were 
completely unpredictive of their prediction errors. This lacking correlation between training 
and prediction errors suggests that lower WMC participants relied on simple exemplar-based 
prediction strategies in these cases. Exemplar-based strategies make only minimal use of the 
training data, do not imply calibration to the training data at all, and hence are virtually 
unreflective of training error.   
 Supporting this interpretation, we found that in case of the asymptotic processes, 
higher WMC participants’ prediction errors were more variable than lower WMC participants’ 
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errors. The different variances reflect that while higher WMC participants made use of a 
whole range of comparatively poorly up to comparatively well-calibrated strategies, the 
exemplar-based strategies used by lower WMC lead to rather consistent results as they rely on 
only the two last training exemplars, and therefore hardly allow for inter-individual 
differences. Higher WMC participants’ strategies were in need of good calibration, with 
comparatively badly calibrated rules leading to comparatively bad predictions. Lower WMC 
participants' simple strategies, in contrast, were robust and unsusceptible towards how much 
(or how little) one has learned during training. Using robust strategies that do not reflect to 
what extent one was successful to abstract the systematic structure of the process, therefore 
proved a particularly adaptive strategy for lower WMC participants. In fact, lower WMC 
participants’ strategies proved robust not only in the sense of being unreflective of learning—
that is, when compared to others also applying this strategy—but even in the sense of being 
equally successful as those applying other, more demanding rule-based strategies. 
 We found that higher WMC does not always lead to more accurate predictions, but 
does so only if the structure of the to-be predicted process requires one to induce rules. This is 
an important qualification of the previous finding on how individual WMC affects the 
accuracy of predictions showing that higher WMC leads to increased use of rules, and to 
better predictions (McDaniel et al., 2014). However, McDaniel et al. operationalized rule-
induction via, and only via, more accurate predictions. In the present study, a more direct 
(independent of prediction accuracy) and encompassing (employing three operationalisations) 
strategy-assessment was used. Results showed that lower compared to higher WMC 
participants were in fact no less accurate predicting processes where simple information-
frugal strategies perform optimal. 
 The present results are comparable to the phenomena of over- and underfitting in 
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machine-learning (Hawkins, 2004; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000). Per definition, underfitting 
occurs when rendering an algorithm more complex and better-calibrated to fit the structure of 
the training data would still pay off in terms of better predictions. Overfitting in turn occurs 
when higher complexity and better calibration does no longer pay off, that is, when a complex 
compared to a simpler prediction algorithm does not produce more accurate predictions. In 
the present study, both phenomena occurred: In the accelerating processes, lower WMC 
participants’ prediction strategies were calibrated less, and this resulted in worse predictions. 
In the asymptotic processes, however, higher WMC participants’ better-calibrated prediction 
strategies did no longer produce better predictions compared to lower WMC participants’ 
simpler strategies. Thus, lower WMC participants’ prediction strategies underfitted the 
accelerating processes, and higher WMC participants’ prediction strategies overfitted the 
asymptotic processes. 
 Perhaps counterintuitively, higher WMC participants used suboptimal strategies 
particularly when performing the comparatively simple task of predicting asymptotic 
processes. What explains this finding, however, is that predicting asymptotic processes is not 
only comparatively simple, but actually surprisingly simple. The steep training region 
suggests structural complexity (and hence the use of more complex rules), but their 
extrapolation region runs relatively flat (and hence is best predicted with simple linear 
strategies). Wagenaar and Sagaria (1975) described this phenomenon as the cognitively “easy 
part” and “hard part” of exponentiality. Our results hence suggest that in cases where “easy 
parts” directly follow “hard parts”, higher WMC may not be a helpful resource. Quite the 
contrary: The higher cognitive control performance may effectively impede one from using 
more elegant approaches. This finding is analogous to the concept of “mental set” in problem 
solving, where simpler solutions for a problem are overlooked if a more complex solution 
!!!
!!
20!
routine has been built up first. Analogously to how the study by Beilock and DeCaro (2007) 
has shown that the tendency to inflexibly maintain mental set is especially pronounced for 
higher WMC participants, we found that higher WMC participants were prone to overlook 
simple—and accurate—prediction strategies. 
 This effect may also explain the contradictory results on why higher cognitive capacity 
sometimes leads to more adaptive strategy-use (Bröder, 2003; Lewandowsky et al., 2012), 
and sometimes to the use of overly complex, non-adaptive strategies (Beilock & DeCaro, 
2007). In the experiments by Bröder (2003) and Lewandowsky et al. (2012), there was one 
strategy that performed optimal throughout each task, whereas in Beilock and DeCaro (2007) 
and in the asymptotic processes in the present study study, complex strategies were successful 
during the first trials, but a simpler solution became available later on. It was then that higher 
WMC participants persisted in using their more complex strategy. Higher WMC participants 
seem to be able to construct a more initially suitable, complex strategy for a given task, but 
may have difficulty giving up this strategy when a simpler strategy becomes available. 
 Cowan (2010) suspected that the positions of working memory capacity limits as a 
weakness versus as a strength may not be incompatible, but that each one may have its merits. 
With respect to predicting non-linear dynamic processes, we find that whether higher capacity 
is beneficial, or not, depends on the type of process to be predicted. Higher working memory 
capacity limits are generally associated with better-calibrated strategies that are more aligned 
with the structure of the processes. This leads to better predictions of difficult, non-linear 
processes, but can result in overfitting and applying overly complex strategies when 
predicting simple processes. In a word: Finding structure is good, but finding more structure 
is not necessarily better. !
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